The Su-75 Checkmate came in a big way—a single-engine fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft to shake up the world market by offering the best capability at a fraction of the price of Western fighters. Ever since its initial public display at the MAKS 2021 airshow, it has been among the key attractions as a possible answer for nations that wish to have world-class performance without the expense of an F-35 or a Eurofighter Typhoon. However, by mid-2025, the path of the Checkmate from conception to production was not linear because it was interrupted, experienced funding failure, and changed directions of world politics.
Theoretically, the jet is a pearl. It is a light tactical stealth interceptor, rated Mach 1.8, with a combat range of about 3,000 kilometers and more than seven tons of payload. Its internal bay is tailored to deliver an assortment of air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, some belonging to the same category as those carried by heavier Su-35 and Su-57 fighters.
The aerodynamically curved airframe and V-tail of the aircraft are carefully designed to reduce visibility on radar, but avionics will have to feature AI-based systems in order to offer maximum situational awareness. Sukhoi also said that the jet was designed with supercomputer modeling—a Russian first—for cost savings and speed of design.
Affordability was Checkmate’s selling point. Sukhoi marketed it as the cost-effective option for air forces that need top-of-the-line stealth capability without having to buy first-class fighters. The price per aircraft was estimated at $25–30 million when it was first conceived, and its operating cost was around $6,000 per hour of flight. Even three versions were designed: one to be single-seat, a two-seat, and an unmanned version, which widened the market for the plane.
But true progress has lagged behind promise. The first flight has been steadily delayed—from 2023 to 2025—and production in high volume is now doubtful before 2027. Government officials maintain development is on track, but doubts can be expressed about the durability of the schedule. The problems are political and economic as well as technical.
The war in Ukraine has served a two-edged purpose for the program. A cheaper, lighter fighter would be used to fill gaps in addition to heavier vehicles, but money, manpower, and industrial base have been invested in supporting existing platforms such as the Su-35 and Su-34 rather than this. This has relegated experimental programs such as the Su-75 to secondary status.
Foreign investment, initially dreamed of as a cornerstone, also didn’t materialize. The United Arab Emirates was once dreamed of as a probable partner for finance and technical knowledge, but interest later waned. Experts mention missed deadlines, sanctions, and priority strategies as Abu Dhabi stepping back. Other countries, like India, have shown interest, but no legally binding deals have followed.
Sanctions have not worked. Limits on imported electronics, precision parts, and other high-technology systems spurred developers to look inward for substitutes, which put the brakes on progress. Recent battlefield accounts pinpoint precisely how dependent so many Russian programs were on imports—and how difficult it was to substitute them internally.
Despite this, Russia continues to unveil the Checkmate on the international front. The aircraft has been presented at defence shows with co-production, technology transfer, and more price reductions on offer to attract customers. This is consistent with global tendencies of large fighter projects, since co-production allows room for political and economic investment.
Still, there is hesitation among prospective buyers. Without a flight testbed, most are not willing to pre-order an airplane that is quite as theoretical in nature at this point. Experience with overrunning programmes such as the Su-57 can only encourage distrust. As impressive as the spec and price are, the lack of hard progress has made many wonder if the Checkmate will ever actually materialise.
Here, the Su-75 Checkmate is optimum and limited. It is a statement, a hint at Russia planning to enter the international market for stealth fighters, yet also of out-of-industrial capability, out-of-budget, and technical limitations. Whether it becomes a mass-purchased fighter or a never-to-be-finished dream will depend as much on economics and diplomacy as on aerodynamics, powerplants, or electronics.