The biographical history of the Northrop YF-23, or “Black Widow II,” is one of the largest “what-ifs” of aviation history. A silky, swift, and groundbreaking next-generation airplane of its design period, the YF-23 left defense strategists and airplane buffs salivating. But it lost out in America. From the Air Force Advanced Tactical Fighter competition during the 1990s, to the Lockheed YF-22 that would evolve into the F-22 Raptor.
There are a number of reasons why this achievement is far greater than sheer performance, and because of those reasons, they are a combination of long-range planning, politics, pilot confidence, and maneuverability.
While the YF-23 was more stealthy and faster than the YF-22, the Air Force desired something greater than a niche item. They desired an airplane that would be adaptable in the long term, incorporating new technology and adjusting to changing missions.
The F-22, not as flashy-looking, provided a less flashy product that balanced stealth with better avionics, combined sensors, and a modular design that can be upgraded relatively rapidly over time. YF-23’s looks, as stunning as they were in their part of the world, were considered to be less flexible and more difficult to adapt as things developed.
Politics and economics entered into it. Defense contracts of major size are seldom chosen on the merit of engineering. Lockheed allied with the industry titans Boeing and General Dynamics, adding to the state’s employment and political power.
Northrop, alternatively, was struggling with its B-2 Spirit program that went over by more than it had been funded for and was under severe examination. Lockheed’s partnership with the Air Force offered leaders a degree of trust and predictability, not merely in the aircraft but in the group of individuals who would build it.
Pilot confidence and flight risk were given top billing. A new-generation fighter must prove reliable not on paper or in the simulator but in the hands of actual pilots in real-world conditions. The F-22 was the more stable, enhanced aircraft, with fewer faults observed in demonstration flights and test flights.
It was more stress-stable, flyable, and the Air Force felt that it could be readily converted into a combat-ready fighter and delivered reliably to operational forces. The YF-23, though capable, could not inspire the same level of confidence for operational deployment.
Lastly, thrust control and maneuverability were factors. Close-in performance was still something to be considered, and the F-22’s thrust-vectoring noses provided it with outstanding agility with improved turn rate, steep-angle maneuver, and steep climb. The YF-23, with stealth and speed optimized at the expense of close-in, compromised some of this close-in in favor of fixed nozzles. Although its vast tail fins provided it with wonderful stability, it lacked any means of keeping up with the F-22’s response during the time it took to complete a turn, a highly prized attribute among experienced combat leaders.
Northrop test pilot Paul Metz, who also flew both of them, went on to say that Northrop built a wonderful airplane but was awkward in marketing it, whereas Lockheed’s demonstration flights were forceful, accurate, and stayed in the minds of the decision-makers. Competition, in a large way, was as much a test of presentation and perceived longevity as it was a test of raw quantity in a spec sheet.
The YF-23 now languishes on museum shelves and in airplane enthusiasts’ daydreams. Its future technology and potential it had still go on to give engineers apilots pauseeuse. Whether the Air Force did the right thing or overlooked something that would have been a game-changer is opinion, a reality that lingers much like the mystery and drama of the Black Widow herself, once full of unparalleled style and promise, ruling the skies.