In the past, Russian tanks have always been seen as a symbol of sheer power on the battlefield. Numerous stories of the mighty armored columns rolling through Europe and the Middle East gave the impression that these vehicles were almost invincible. Contrary to this, recent fights, especially in Ukraine and Syria, have drastically altered this portrayal. The formerly powerful T-72 and its various derivatives have become one of the most easily targeted and extensively damaged vehicle groups in modern warfare.
The T-72 was made with the Soviet Cold War mentality in mind. Compared to the majority of Western main battle tanks, it was not built to be multifunctional or to last in prolonged fights. Its functions were to the point: take the offensive against the enemy, smash through their front, and clear the way for the march of infantry and other supporting forces. The main factors that the designers considered were not adaptability but speed, low cost, and fast production.
One of the features of the T-72 to accomplish this was an autoloader, which made the crew only three people, and a small silhouette, which made it more difficult to find on the battlefield. The characteristics “versatile, fast, easy to operate, and a low-cost killing machine” of the T-72 were once enumerated by a retired T-72 commander. The later Russian tank development took the principal configuration of the T-72 with them heavily, but while adding firepower and armor, the underlying architecture never got far enough to tackle the problems of modern, high-intensity warfare.
The consequences for the T-72 family have been harsh in recent wars. The losses of Russian tanks in Ukraine, among which T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s have been the most, have almost reached the number of 2,000. Many of those destroyed vehicles were only up against relatively old Ukrainian T-64s, which, however, were supported by modern anti-tank systems. The pictures and videos of Russian tanks getting destroyed are not only becoming more and more common but also evoke a very grim reaction.
The story doesn’t change much with Syria. The Syrian Arab Army came close to losing 1,000 T-72 all in less than ten years, a big number of which were destroyed by poorly armed insurgents. To compare, Western tanks like the Abrams suffered a lot fewer casualties than those in similar situations. Even the Russian reports admit the extent of these failures.
One of the significant design errors of the Russian tanks is the way the ammunition is carried. In the T-72 and its derivatives, cartridges are set in a revolving chamber under the turret just below the crew. If an attack that penetrates the armor is made, the most probable scenario is that it will cause very dangerous explosions, thus ejecting the turret into the air, which is known as the “jack-in-the-box” effect. Eastern tanks of the type Abrams and Leopa, however, keep their ammunition in compartments that have been armored and equipped with blow-out panels; ls, therefore, if there is an explosion, it is directed away from the crew, and they become much safer.
The level of the crew training as well as their experience are also major factors. Those who operate a tank determine to a large extent its efficiency. In the war in Iraq, T-72 crews, which were not well-trained, had a hard time performing. Similar problems have come up in Syria and Ukraine. Non-skilled operators, poor coordination, and the worsening situation due to the nervousness of the opponents under fire are the factors that increase the weak points of these machines.
Viral footage from Ukraine, for example, shows a skilled Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew destroying a T-90M by hitting its lightly armored rear, while the Russian crew failed to mount any meaningful defense. Analysts point out that a significant number of the most skilled Russian tank personnel were killed in the early stages of these conflicts, thus experienced crews are now the first to be deployed, while less-trained ones are left to face the remaining fighting.
On the other hand, Western heavy armor, such as the Leopard and Abrams tank, is more powerful, more costly, and features superior optics, armor, and survivability gadgets. Even the infantry fighting vehicles like Bradley can do a lot of damage to the Russian tanks if there are trained crews and they use modern munitions and fire-control systems.
The main point learned from the situation is that Russian tank losses do not solely point to old tank designs. They are reflective of a mixture of factors such as tanks being vulnerable due to design features, undertrained crews, and battlefields filled with drones, precision-guided munitions, and sophisticated targeting gear.
It is undeniable that the T-72 was made for a type of conflict that is no longer applicable. Nowadays, just having a huge number of tanks is not enough to assure winning. The capacity to survive, the ability to adapt, and the competence of the crew are the real factors of victory, and the experiences in Syria and Ukraine have become a source of the costly nature of these shortcomings.