The Littoral Combat Ship, known as LCS, was in the beginning a program that promised to be the answer to the Navy’s next-generation program – a fast, flexible, and versatile warship that could do everything from minesweeping to anti-submarine operations, and all this at a fraction of the cost of traditional vessels. Now, the program serves as a negative example of the use of the Navy’s funds: innovative but expensive, and leaving a legacy that is still complex and confusing for the Navy.
The program was New in early 2000, and the Navy was in the process of shrinking its fleet, and many of its ships were at the end of their lifetimes. The intent was simple: build a small, multi-mission warship that could carry out less intense operations, so thereby the big shot could do the high-value missions. The cost of each ship was expected to be around $ 400 million, which was even three times less than that of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
The main difference with the LCS was its modular design and a very small crew, which was mostly made up of automated machinery and robots. The then-deputy defense secretary Bob Work was describing the idea as daring, one of the first experiments, and a clear deviation from the traditional shipbuilding paradigm.
But the Navy was overambitious. They commenced the ship production before they had their plans 100% finalized, which meant they had skipped numerous standard testing phases. The first ship was inducted into service in 200,8, which was quite early compared to other Pentagon projects. Bryan Clark from the Hudson Institute, a critic, points out that while the program had been rushed to innovate, it didn’t leave much room for safety, and to make matters worse, the imposition of more requirements just added another layer of complexity.
The problems came quickly and were very visible. Even though the ship’s main feature, which is the mission package, had been talked about for a long time was actually very hard to implement and was always behind schedule. The trouble that anti-sub systems had with sonar deployment, the falling of minesweeping modules in terms of pace, transmission problems in hull designs, and cracks at high speeds, a fatal problem of ships that need to work fast, were also part of the issues in the program. Efforts to rotate special crews among different ships also fail, resulting in a decrease in operational effectiveness.
The costs went far beyond what was initially projected. The ships that were supposed to cost no more than $250 million each ended up even exceeding $500 million, excluding the expensive mission packages. Although the government was supporting the program at the very beginning and wanted to buy the Freedom and Independence-class ships in large quantities, technical setbacks, maintenance challenges, and the lack of performance put the program under heavy criticism. By 2016, the rigorous inspections were needed because of recurring engine problems, but the program’s reputation was already compromised.
At the same time, the Navy was changing the area of strategy and tactics. The LCS could have done shallow water operations only; however, the danger to these kinds of missions increased along with the evolving threats. A few ships were decommissioned less than five years after they were launched, which is way below the expected 25-year lifespan of the program. That early retirement resulted in the loss of service of roughly $7 billion, not including operating costs saved by removing them from active duty, according to analysts.
It was a hard call, but the caller chose to go the other way. Ex-Navy officer Bryan McGrath stated that it would have been more expensive and less efficient during a high-end war if the ships stayed in commission. Mackenzie Eaglen from the American Enterprise Institute brought up the point of the high operating costs of about $70 million per ship per year as another reason for the program to end prematurely.
The program was not a total failure, though. Eventually, the minesweeping mission package became functional, thus opening the door to the first-ever use of unmanned vehicles in the clearing of minefields.
As things stand, the LCS story is a lesson that Navy innovation differs from one to another in its necessity to balance ambition with pragmatism. Even with the most promising ideas, if there is no thorough testing, precise planning, and the capability to adapt to emerging threats, they are likely to be costly.
One congressional staffer’s remark is that although the Navy may have been late in recognizing the LCS’s faults, it won’t be the last time it will benefit from those insights: the fleet of the future will be designed by them.