Strategic nuclear arms control has ever been a game of high-stakes chess, fought out over decades of tension, negotiation, and technological development. The deadline for the New START Treaty hangs over us, threatening to bring to an end an age of mutual predictability and begin an era of uncertainty that has the potential to reshape the international nuclear order.
The process started in the late 1960s when it dawned on the United States and the Soviet Union that uncontrolled proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) systems would destabilize the precarious balance of fear. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) were the first attempts at freezing and limiting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles based on national technical means—i.e., spy satellites and intelligence collection—instead of intrusive inspections. As Robert Gates, the past Secretary of Defense, once noted, the true benefit of these initial conversations was to sit down with military and civilian leaders to learn about one another’s nuclear plans and intentions.
The 1991 START Treaty represented a watershed moment, calling for actual reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and a strong verification regime. On-site inspections, data exchanges, and notifications became routine, enabling each side to make better-informed decisions in planning their deterrence investments. The Moscow Treaty (SORT) that followed and the New START further reduced the ceilings on deployed warheads and delivery vehicles, with the New START being touted as the “gold standard” for verification by each side. It counted resident warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, added distinct identifiers for launchers, and reduced inspections to minimize disruption of operations.
But political winds have changed. The unraveling of Cold War treaties, Russia’s departure from key accords, and China’s ascension as a nuclear nation have undermined the pillars of strategic arms control. According to the Council on Strategic Risks, “The next president of the United States will inherit the most dangerous strategic security environment since the end of the Cold War.” The lapse of New START risks leaving the world without verifiable constraints on the two largest nuclear stockpiles for the first time since 1972.
Technically, both Russia and the United States possess high upload capacity. The U.S. could increase its deployed warheads by more than two by reloading ICBMs and SLBMs, bringing “warm” silos online, and rapidly loading bombers with hundreds of cruise missiles and bombs. Russia could also bring its ICBM and SLBM warhead numbers up, particularly by undoing past “downloading” to comply with treaty ceilings. As described by Matt Korda of the Federation of American Scientists, “Together, if both nations uploaded their delivery systems to hold the maximum number of potential warheads, both arsenals would roughly double in size.” The expense of such an increase is relatively small compared to the overall defense budget, so the scenario is possible should worst-case planning prevail.
But the true threat is not merely in numbers, but in the erosion of transparency and verification. Without the data exchanges, notifications, and inspections of New START, each side would have to fall back on national technical means, overloading intelligence resources and breeding suspicion. The lack of a formal dispute settlement body, such as the Bilateral Consultative Commission, would make it more difficult to settle compliance issues and technical uncertainties. As the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists indicates, “Short of a new treaty, Russia and the United States would lose mutual predictability and trust. It would also mean that military planners would have to rely more on worst-case scenarios, subsequently accelerating defense spending that could result in an even more costly and unstable arms race.”
Verification is a two-edged sword. Intrusive inspections can uncover cheating, but also have the potential to generate surveillance bias, in which the quest for violation becomes a goal in itself. Political backing for arms control is usually conditional on strong verification, but absolute certainty is unattainable. As Paul Nitze once persuasively contended, successful verification is being able to discover militarily relevant violations in time to react to them, not catching all trivial discrepancies.
Modernization makes things even more complicated. Both nations are modernizing their nuclear triads, with new ICBMs, bombers, and submarines going into service. The U.S. is replacing older Minuteman III missiles with the Sentinel program, and Russia is deploying new systems such as the RS-28 Sarmat and Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. New technologies—cyber, AI, advanced sensors—complicate conventional understanding of command and control, survivability, and escalation dynamics. The B-52 Stratofortress, say, is still a workhorse due to constant modernization of avionics, communications, and weapons integration, demonstrating the flexibility needed in contemporary nuclear strategy.
The strategic landscape is more congested and unstable than ever before. China is building up its nuclear capability, going beyond a minimal deterrent to aim for parity with America and Russia. As noted by the Federation of American Scientists, “China no longer seems content with merely a few hundred nuclear weapons to protect its security, and, in a departure from long-standing doctrine, may now be eyeing its own nuclear force as closer to that of US and Russian deployed nuclear forces.” This makes future arms control calculations more difficult, since trilateral negotiations would necessitate new structures and compromises.
So what are the prospects for stability? Ongoing compliance with New START’s limits, even unofficially, might gain time and continue predictability, though legal and political obstacles are plentiful. Executive agreements provide flexibility but are susceptible to being overturned by subsequent administrations. The best solution—a new, ratified treaty—comes with formidable challenges in today’s geopolitical environment. Meanwhile, risk reduction steps, transparency measures, and communication forums are needed to avoid miscalculation and escalation.
In the end, strategic nuclear arms control’s future hinges on will, technical creativity, and a clear-eyed view of national security interests. Spending on expertise, modernization, and discussion—both with competitors and friends—will be key. History has repeatedly demonstrated that arms control is a means, not an end in itself, but a way of managing competition, minimizing threats, and sustaining peace in a world where the stakes could not be higher.