Following the hard loss at Kasserine Pass, the US II Corps was at a critical juncture in North Africa. The defeat had revealed glaring weaknesses in American leadership, coordination, and combat preparedness. When General Harold Alexander of the 18th Army Group inspected II Corps in February 1943, he was in no way impressed. His staff report gave a dark picture of the command under Major General Lloyd Fredendall. But amidst the criticism, there was a glimmer of hope: morale of the troops was quite good, and Major General Orlando Ward’s 1st Armored Division was looking positive.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, had heard enough about Fredendall’s shortcomings. He made the firm choice to replace him with Major General George S. Patton, Jr. as II Corps’ new commander. To balance matters, Eisenhower also assigned Major General Omar Bradley as Patton’s deputy, half to keep an eye on Patton’s notoriously explosive and aggressive temperament. Patton got the message well and soon made Bradley his trusted right-hand man.
Patton acted quickly. He assumed command of approximately 88,000 troops, including the 1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Armored Division, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, the 1st Ranger Battalion, and several tank destroyer battalions dispersed throughout the corps. Convinced that time was short, Eisenhower and Alexander pressed through several changes to enhance II Corps’ combat capability. They deployed experienced British liaison officers from the Eighth Army to counsel and coordinate, replaced the ineffective American 37mm antitank guns with more robust British 6-pounders, and added strength to the ranks by incorporating experienced troops and officers from other divisions.
Patton’s task was simple: drive enemy units out of Gafsa and then march east to El Guettar, Sened Station, and Maknassy. The objective wasn’t to sprint to the coast but to obtain steady, positive victories that would restore morale in II Corps and among Allied commanders. Americans also had the mission of tempting Axis forces away from Field Marshal Montgomery’s Eighth Army, which marched north up the Mareth Line toward Tunis.
The drive began with Ward’s 1st Armored Division advancing on Gafsa, only to find the enemy had already withdrawn. Patton urged his troops to continue the pace, but the desert soon turned into a sea of mud after heavy rains, making vehicles stuck and hindering their advance. Colonel William Darby’s 1st Ranger Battalion captured El Guettar with hardly any resistance, but advancing towards Sened was more difficult. As American forces finally arrived in Sened, artillery attacks pushed out the final defenders, most of whom were taken prisoner as they retreated.
Patton’s aggressive instinct occasionally conflicted with the more conservative line his superiors wished him to take. Originally instructed to conduct only a demonstration towards Maknassy, Patton insisted on a full-scale attack instead, including the capture of commanding heights and the attacks on enemy airfields.
Nevertheless, Ward’s armored units frequently discovered that Axis forces had escaped, with the Americans fighting their way through mud and confusion. Ward, who was notorious for being cautious, preferred to organize measured, planned attacks instead of committing expensive daylight attacks with exhausted men—a reserve to which Patton was irksome.
The actual test arrived when the Germans countered. Early on the morning of March 23, 1943, the Axis’s sole mobile reserve, the 10th Panzer Division, hit hard. Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen’s 1st Infantry Division had seen the panzers advance before dawn down the valley. The Germans gained some early successes but were halted at the Keddab wadi, where eight tanks were destroyed by an American minefield. American guns and tank destroyers soon followed, knocking out some 30 more. The Germans retreated, reorganized, and attempted again in the evening but were stopped once again by persistent artillery fire.
The combat around El Guettar was bitter but concluded without a decisive result. Both sides were battered, and neither could advance a significant offensive in the days following. But the Americans demonstrated a clear improvement in cohesion and resilience. As opposed to the dispersed small-unit strategy employed in February, II Corps now operated as an organized force, maintaining the initiative and counterattacking rapidly to adversary movements.
Patton’s leadership was not without conflict. His irritation with Ward’s slower pace ultimately caused Ward to be relieved. Though Patton and the other generals yearned for a more aggressive drive to the coast, Alexander’s slow-but-sure build-up of momentum through small, incremental victories paid off. As the campaign continued, II Corps played an increasingly larger role, and the Allies maintained the advantage for the remainder of the North African battle.
North Africa was a difficult proving ground for the new American army. The hard-won lessons in Tunisia—through experience, mistake, and adaptation—shaped the forces that would later fight throughout Europe. Patton’s transformation of II Corps was a watershed, making it a more effective, confident, and capable fighting force. After the campaign, the Allies had inflicted almost 200,000 Axis losses and taken some 275,000 prisoners, a devastating blow and opening the way to greater success in the Mediterranean theater.