The A-12 Avenger II was once the dream of the Navy of the future. It was a stealth, carrier-based bomber that could evade enemy defenses and penetrate deep into the adversary’s land. By the end of the 80s, the Navy’s trusty A-6 Intruder was becoming outdated, and the atmosphere of the Cold War required a new aircraft that was capable of surviving radar-guided missiles and advanced air defense systems. This demand led to the Advanced Tactical Aircraft program, which was a daring project of designing the Navy’s next-generation stealth strike plane.
The Air Force had already baffled everyone in the world with the birth of the F-117 Nighthawk, and the Navy wanted a similar stealth wonder of its own to take off from carrier decks. The contract was won by McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics in 1988, and the A-12 Avenger II was looking to be, on paper, a change of the game.
Its conception was not the same as anything ever before—sharp, triangular wings that had quickly brought on the nickname “Flying Dorito.” Hidden bomb bays protected its radar invisibility, while lightweight and tough new composite materials were used for the aircraft to be not only strong but also light.
Special coatings made it even harder for the enemy to detect it. There would be two crew members on board, along with the most cutting-edge avionics, targeting radar, and electronic warfare gear, and with the promise of a combat radius of over 900 miles, it would have been way superior to the aircraft it was designed to replace.
Unfortunately, making this futuristic design a functional plane was much more difficult than the conception. Stealth demands turned out to be opposites to the stringent carrier operations, harsh landings, and takeoffs where the machines must be able to bear. The weight that was increasing beyond the limits of safety was making it questionable whether the aircraft was even able to work from carriers. Only more delays and setbacks resulted from the use of unproven materials and manufacturing methods.
The fact that this program was kept a secret made the problems even worse. Because it was a “black” project, the usual scope was very limited, and many in Congress and the Pentagon were not very aware of how much the situation had deteriorated. Those responsible for the programs made the problems seem less severe than they were, and Navy officials, for fear of seeing the project terminated completely, did not do so by drawing attention to the spreading issues.
Things on the financial side deteriorated very fast. The development budget, which was initially $4.8 billion, went through the roof and arrived at almost 11$ billion, and the price per aircraft estimated exceeded $165 million. By 1991, the A-12 was late for more than a year and a half, way over the budget, and it was still not ready for flight.
The turning point was in January 1991, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney called off the project, bringing an end to what is the most expensive contract termination in the history of the Pentagon. A life-size mockup was the only A-12 ever made, so it was never able to fly. The legal dispute with the contractors went on for about twenty years long and the case between them and the government finally got settled in 2014.
After the retirement of the A-6 and the absence of a stealth bomber to replace it, the Navy relied on the F/A-18 Hornet and later on the Super Hornet for its strike missions. At some point, F-35C, which was supposed to carry stealth on carrier decks, came, but it was still not the type of long-range attack aircraft the A-12 had promised to be.
The A-12 Avenger II is now remembered as one of the most famous of the American aviation history negative side tales. It relates the story of the risks taken by going into untested technology, the dangers of bad management, and the traps of keeping things too secret.
The “Flying Dorito” has never been airborne; however, its account had a role in reforming how the Pentagon’s major weapons programs are supervised, leading to greater regulations and more realistic objectives before trillions of dollars are spent on the following advancement in air power.