Back in 1974, the day the Navy rejected the A-12 proposal, the choice had seemed clear enough: To save the Pentagon a heap of cash in both the short and long run, it made sense to adapt the Air Force’s F-117 stealth fighter for the Navy.
On paper, A-12 was the next-generation strike aircraft for the Navy—a stealthy, carrier-based bomber that could easily outstrip enemy defenses and target deep inside hostile lands. By the late 1980s, the very old and very out-of-fashion A-6 Intruder was already limiting the Navy’s operational ability, and the growing threats of the Cold War era were demanding a plane that could survive in such a world dominated by radar-guided missiles and sophisticated air defense networks.
The ATA project came from the need for an aircraft that could counter the lethal threat posed by radars and supersonic SAM (surface-to-air missile) missiles. Thus, the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program was born to raise the bar for carrier-based stealth attack jets. The pundits already were comparing the F117-based concept with the XB-70, gravely napalming in pictures shown in their papers.
The core of the idea was impressive – a triangular wing thought to be the “Flying Dorito” by its designers, carrying its armaments under the skin to remain effectively hidden from radar, made of new materials developed specifically for the project, and further coated with radar-absorbent paint.
Advanced ground-mapping radar and avionics, operated by two crew members trained on revolutionary flight controls, were to have been aboard the A-12. The A-12 would have boasted a stunning range, being able to hit targets over 900 nautical miles away, which was unprecedented up to that time.
But that dream was to take a long time before being turned into a functioning plane. The combination of stealth needs and the high stresses of carrier takeoffs and landings proved to be a major technical problem. Many times the plane’s weight exceeded detailed estimates, thus she could not take off from the carrier safely to a certain level. Very often, delays and technical setbacks occurred because of the use of experimental materials and new production methods.
And the secrecy didn’t help. The program was a little secret “black” program, with limited oversight. Congress and the Pentagon were kept quite in the dark about the program’s problems, while the contractors played down the difficulties to keep up morale, and Naval authorities had concerns about stopping the program because it would mean losing ground.
Costs went through the roof. It was first estimated that the program would cost $4.8 billion, but the actual development costs went beyond that and reached almost $11 billion, and even more than $165 million per plane was predicted. In 1991, the whole program was off its timeline by 18 months, way over budget with several billion dollars, and still far from being ready to fly. The Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stopped the project in January, making it the biggest single contract cancellation in the Pentagon’s history. The only A-12 was built as a full-scale model.
The consequences of this fiasco continued for decades. The contractors and the government litigated for years about it, and the Navy, which, though, got the short end of the stick and lost the A-6, relied on the F/A-18 Hornet, the Super Hornet, and the F-35C as a long-range bomber substitute eventually. The F-35C was late for the carrier and could not have been considered a replacement for the A-12.
Eventually, the A-12 Avenger II became a serious educational talking point in military aviation. It demonstrates the dangers of attempting too much with unknown technology, downplaying the difficulties that could be faced during engineering, and operating in complete secrecy.
The “Flying Dorito” was never deployed in a battle, but this episode drew a heavier emphasis on strict supervision, realistic planning, and careful financing before risking billions of dollars on future generation aircraft among the Pentagon staff when it comes to dealing with big weaponry projects.