The Baltic peninsula is an area for innovative war strategy from many decades, a battlefield where Russian desire and NATO resolve conflict in a war of technology, speed, and possible fear of conflicts escalation. To understand what’s at stake, you have to look above the headlines and in the essentials of the military doctrines, equipment, and allegiances that underpin this volatile frontier make a Baltic flashpoint for tension.
Russia’s reaction to the Baltic flashpoint triggering activities is motivated by a combination of historical grievance, strategic paranoia, and a desire to regain great power status. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Ukraine, Moscow’s intent to use violence to remap borders was never in doubt. As the German Council on Foreign Relations discovers in a detailed report, Russia’s ruling parties are cramped by the West and determined to hold their frontiers by pushing out into the abroad Soviet supporters, such as the Baltic states. This concept deserves a policy of endless confrontation, based on military and a sophisticated arsenal of hybrid warfare including cyber attacks, disinformation, energy blackmail, and troops sudden mobilization of ethnic Russian minorities.
Within operations, its anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) policy is the fulcrum of its military presence in the area. Kaliningrad, its heavily militarized mobilization on Poland’s border with Lithuania a key region. Russia has deployed here a squadron of S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile defence systems, Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles, crème-de-la-crème electronic warfare packages like the Krasukha-4, and even fifth-generation fighter aircraft like the Su-35 and Su-27. The S-400, which covers a distance of approximately 400 kilometres and can cover most of Poland, the Baltic countries, and some parts of Germany, which creates a deadly shadow that complicates any NATo air campaign. Its 500 kilometre range enables it to strike to the strategic NATo targets deep within Europe. Russian vessels in the Baltic, like Steregushchiy-class corvettes equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles, project this bubble even further afield, attacking sea and land targets in equal measure.
Belarus, closer than ever to Moscow since the 2020 crackdown on protests, is a Russian strategic extension. Its border boasts combined air defenses S-300s, S-400s, and Tor-M2 batteries, that cooperate to fill out Russia’s A2/AD network. The Suwalki Gap, the slender 65 kilometre strip along which Kaliningrad is linked to Belarus, is the weak spot on NATO’s eastern edge. Should the Russians take over this corridor, they would be able to sever the Baltic states from the remainder of the alliance to leave them isolated outposts where they could be easily overrun.
Russian military modernization has been relentless. The Western Military District, bordering the Baltic, contains three army commands, five new divisional headquarters, and a range of mechanized, airborne, and special forces troops. Exercises like Zapad rehearse massive, intense war against NATO on a conventional plus nuclear scale. According to the German Council on Foreign Relations’ definition, these exercises are designed to develop quickly and land harder than NATO can respond, to offer the alliance a “fait accompli” before bringing up reinforcements. Threats to use nuclear weapons as a means of escalation are not theoretical, Russian strategic thinking unambiguously contemplates the limited use of nuclear weapons in an effort to de-escalate a crisis on their own terms.
The Baltics’ weakness is not just geographical. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all have small, poorly equipped militaries and large Russian-speaking minorities, especially in Estonia and Latvia. Although recent opinion polls show these constituencies are in significant measure devoted to their countries, the shadow of Crimea and Donbas still looms. Russia’s compatriot policy attempts to retain them within its orbit, employing media, passports, and political mobilization as means. But efforts at integration in the Baltics have come a long way, and the risk of a Crimea-like rebellion is low, but not zero.
NATO’s response to this multi-dimensional threat has been a multi-layered one embracing deterrence, immediate response, and sustained presence. The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroups, multi-national battle-groups of around 1,200 troops each, are in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Commanded on a rotating basis by the UK, Canada, Germany, and the US, the battle-groups are not there to prevent a large-scale Russian invasion but as a tripwire to guarantee that any penetration would be countered with a combined NATO effort. There is also air policing. Such locations as Ämari in Estonia and Šiauliai in Lithuania have rotational detachments from across the alliance, most recently German Eurofighters, French Mirage 2000-5s, and Hungarian Gripens, that offer a 24/7 air defence umbrella. NATO’s Allied Air Command refers those such deployments as a show of “allied will and determination” to protect all of NATO airspace for everyone to watch.
The rate of air intercepts has dramatically increased. Russian planes, often flying without flight plans or making their transponders on, frequently enter inside NATO airspace. British RAF Typhoons, Norwegian F-35s, Italian Eurofighters, and several other nations’ aircraft have repeatedly scrambled to escort or intercept Russian bombers, recce aircraft, and fighter aircraft over the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Black Sea. These rapid reaction advisories are not a spectacle, they are proof of readiness and interoperability. As Brigadier General Andrew Hansen of Allied Air Command explained, intercepting the several formations of Russian aircraft shows NATO’s advance capability to safeguard allied airspace.
The development of air defence operations has also witnessed the transfer of command roles from the United States to NATO itself. In recent years, NATO assumed direct control of air defence operations in Poland to secure logistics supports critical for the supply of Ukraine. Norway-based F-35s have scrambled to intercept Russian drones in NATO airspace, as a sign of rising capabilities among European airpower. “The alliance is rapidly gaining the ability to do more and more,” NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, said. New tasks like Baltic Sentry, to keep an eye on Russian sabotage of submarine cables, are being completed completely without the involvement of US assets.
Speed and responsiveness are the watchwords of the new NATO policy. The alliance has accelerated decision-making, with an eye towards readying fast-response forces within 8 to 12 hours. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)-led NATO Response Force (NRF) is meant to deploy quickly to the areas of crisis, although it is also condemned for lacking the flexibility of its predecessor, Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. War planners like Richard D. Hooker, Jr., have been calling for a rebuilt NATO Rapid action Force, air-mobile, light, and multinational, to bridge the gap and give time for reinforcements to arrive. Routine, military exercises test out these concepts, from multinational parachute drops to combined air defence activities and command post exercises, keeping the alliance fit.
Technology is the final arbiter. NATO air policing is based on a mix of fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft, Eurofighters, F-16s, F-35s equipped by airborne early warning, electronic warfare, and missile defence systems like the US Patriot. Russia itself has the Su-35 range phased array radar and thrust-vectoring engines and claims to be able to match Western fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The virtual battlefield is no less fierce, with Russian capabilities like the Krasukha-4 capable of jamming radar and blinding the ISR equipment.
The Baltic standoff is not a troops numbers or most advanced war equipment battle, it is a contest to respond fastest, integrate best, and maintain the technological advancement to dominiate the region. The cost is high for the small nations on NATO’s border, but the risks extend through the alliance. As the front line of the new European security, the Baltic states deterrence is put to the test daily, not on the war game battlefields, but in the discreet, the secret air patrols, radar sweeps, and watchful eyes of servicemen and airmen from dozens of nations.
