The recent flurry of Russian incursions into NATO airspace has escalated from routine provocations into a higher level of calculated technological and strategic probing. In little more than two weeks, alliance countries from Poland to Estonia have been hit with waves of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles and nuclear-capable combat planes, with NATO retaliating by scrambling next-generation planes and activating missile defenses in the most overt military confrontation between the alliance and Russia since the invasion of Ukraine.
The Poland Drone Swarm: Low-Cost, High-Impact Probe
On September 9–10, Polish radar detected approximately 24 Russian drones shot from various places, including Belarus. These Gerbera models—constructed using plywood and Styrofoam—are approximately €10,000 per drone, but flew hundreds of kilometers into Polish airspace, with some flight paths targeting Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport, a key NATO logistics hub. NATO’s response was Polish F-16s, Dutch F-35s, German Patriot systems, and Italian AWACS spy planes under the Eastern Sentry deployment posture. The economic disparity was stark: multimillion-dollar interceptors pitted against drones that cost a fraction of that figure.
Fighter Jet Incursion Over Estonia
Just days prior, three MiG-31s on combat escort flew into Estonian airspace above the Gulf of Finland for 12 minutes under the auspices of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, escorted out by Italian F-35s. The planes had no flight plans, transponders disabled, and no radio communication—a violation Estonia’s foreign minister labeled as “unprecedentedly brazen.” The event brought to mind Cold War-era probing, but with stealth and electronic countermeasures making detection more difficult in the post-Cold War world.
Defying NATO’s Integrated Air Defense
These incidents highlight vulnerabilities in NATO’s multi-layered air defense system, designed to resist high-speed ballistic and cruise missiles. Composite material small UAVs have low radar returns, working against systems optimized for metal targets. Patriot batteries and AMRAAM AIM-120 missiles, though effective, are costly and in limited supply. The need for a 400% increase in air and missile-defense capability to handle ongoing low-cost drone harassment has been requested by NATO commanders.
Electronic Warfare and Countermeasures to Drones
Russian drones have been resistant to jamming and spoofing, with inertial navigation allowing them to carry out missions in the absence of satellite support. Some are programmed to receive their “home” coordinates as target locations, meaning jamming can speed up an attack rather than stopping one. The Ukrainian experience shows that layered defenses are needed—ground emplaced guns, mobile interceptors, fighter jets, and electronic warfare—are required to combat swarms.
The Cost Asymmetry Problem
Experts warn that it is not viable to shoot million-dollar missiles at €10,000 drones. As Robert Tollast of RUSI explains, “The cost asymmetry doesn’t work.” European defense firms are racing to produce cheaper interceptors, like the high-energy laser weapon Apollo and the air-to-air version Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System for Eurofighter Typhoons. Norway-based company Nammo is manufacturing low-cost missiles combined with drone targets, and companies such as MARSS and Origin Robotics offer reusable AI-driven interceptors.
Hybrid Warfare and Infrastructure Disruption
The intrusions are just one aspect of a broader Russian campaign of hybrid warfare, as defined by GPS jamming throughout the Baltic Sea area, disruption of undersea cables, and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. Denmark’s defense minister classified recent news of drones spotted near several airports as a “hybrid attack,” highlighting the integration of UAV operations into multi-domain disruption campaigns.
Political Signaling and Alliance Cohesion
Experts consider such questions as “coercive signaling” aimed at exploiting cracks in NATO. Edward Lucas warned that Russia is eager to “seed the toxic question in the minds of allies: Are you prepared to risk a war with Russia for the sake of the Baltic states?
” The restrained initial U.S. response—President Trump speculated the Polish invasion “could have been a mistake” before later urging NATO to remove intruders—has likely emboldened Moscow to determine whether European forces will operate independently of direct American backing.
Procurement Bottlenecks and Wartime Innovation
Although Ukraine’s warfront has spurred drone technology uptake, NATO procurement is behind. MARSS’s interceptor drones and Robin Radar’s Shahed sensors are being used in Ukraine, but not yet officially tested by NATO. Tekever’s AR3 surveillance drones, trialed in Ukraine, are now rolling into RAF service with embedded electronic warfare capability, demonstrating how wartime collaboration shortens procurement cycles.
The Strategic Risk of Miscalculation
Every incursion shortens the window for crisis management. The precedent of Turkey’s 2015 shooting down of a Russian Su-24 illustrates how fast a violation of airspace can get out of hand. With 5,500 drones a month that can be produced by Russia and over 800 dispatched at once during an evening, sustained pressure could bleed NATO interceptors and expose gaps in coverage, risking an accident that would spill over into open conflict. The recent actions of Russia combine low-tech, low-cost technological pressure with high-tension political signaling. NATO’s task is to develop air defense doctrine, accelerate procurement of low-cost countermeasures, and maintain alliance cohesion in the face of ongoing hybrid warfare. The Kremlin’s probing is as much about mapping NATO’s technical vulnerabilities as it is about testing its political will.