In the armored warfare of this new world, there is no fight more polarizing than that of the American M1 Abrams and the Russian T-90. They are not tanks as much as they are war machines of two very different ideologies about how to wage war. Both look marvelous on paper, but the battlefield is quite adept at separating theory from reality.
The T-90 is an expression of Russia’s mass production and efficiency culture. It’s an extension of the T-72, naturally, but with a 125mm smoothbore cannon and an autoloader that reduces the crew to three men, and such technology as Shtora-1 that can jam incoming missiles. It is light, relatively small, and hard to see, so it can maneuver where heavier tanks cannot. But at that lightness is a cost: its armor and survivability don’t always perform as well against contemporary threats as they could.
Western tanks do things differently. The M1 Abrams—and its peer, such as Germany’s Leopard 2—is built to a single overbearing imperative over all else: live crew survive and offer full fire. The Abrams is protected by some of the thickest armor in the world, topped by depleted uranium plates. Its 120mm gun, sophisticated fire control, and sights allow it to hit targets with unrivaled accuracy even in adverse weather. It’s powered by a heavy gas turbine engine that gives it the velocity, but at the expense of fuel-guzzling consumption. In contrast to the T-90, it also employs four men, a human loader among them, who not only load the rounds but also add extra eyes and arms to shoot with.
The most notable difference between them is the way they handle men’s lives. Western tanks such as Abrams place ammunition in armoured boxes that are separated from one another by blowout panels so that an explosion cannot reach the crew. The T-90, however, still has the Soviet-era carousel autoloader, where ammunition is loaded within the turret along with the crew. This arrangement will cause the terminal “jack-in-the-box” effect when destroyed, kicking the whole turret off with little chance of survival.
Firepower and technology are in their places, too. The T-90 gun can launch guided missiles at a distance, a handy trick of its kind for some environments. But the Abrams will typically prevail in actual shootouts, due to improved armor-piercing ammunition, sophisticated targeting, and infrared sight that allows it to remain able to kill well even under extreme stress.
Combat experience has already delivered its verdict of a kind. In Syria, the T-90 had impressed by eliminating older missiles, but in Ukraine its weakness came into view. More sophisticated Western weapons, such as the Javelin, and air bombing from above by drones, exploited its thin top armor and dangerous ammunition storage and inflicted heavy casualties on it. Functional kit like “cage” armor was useless, and the slow reversing of the tank would get wedged in the open under fire.
The Abrams, in comparison, has forty years of performance legitimacy. During the Gulf War, it quickly wiped out Iraqi T-72s with ease, showing just how better it was at protection and firepower. In subsequent battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were lessons learned and armor also improved, as well as the incorporation of active protection systems to kill incoming rockets. When Abrams tanks have been lost, it’s been due to more IEDs and mines than enemy tanks.
The problem is not unique to the T-90. The old T-72, which is still being produced in high numbers, has done even worse. Its antiquated sights, thin armor, and deadly ammo placement have had it on the list of history’s most mishandled tanks. Western tanks continue to employ modular armor and sophisticated defense systems, but continue to utilize mostly reactive armor. That was to be eliminated in the T-14 Armata, whose turret and crew compartment were unmanned and safer, respectively, but thus far is on the market only in small quantities and has not yet been tested in combat.
In the future, all of these bills will be transferred to the next generation. America is producing the M1A3 Abrams, which will be lighter, more fuel-efficient in its consumption, and maybe even equipped with fancy new whizbangs like an autoloader or even an unmanned turret. Europe is producing the MGCS program and Britain the Challenger 3, all focusing on enhanced protection, smarter sensors, and greater connectivity.
But the reality is, there are no invincible tanks. New battlefields are flooded with guided missiles, cheap drones, and portable anti-tank missiles. What is chosen at design time—where to keep the ammo and how much, how to protect the crew, how to incorporate new tech—is what will determine whether a tank gets to survive in this harsh world.
The T-90’s history of failures in Ukraine is testimony that survival and victory are less a function of how powerful a machine theoretically is than a function of how well a machine operates at keeping its crew alive and dealing with the dangers of the contemporary battlefield.