The A-12 Avenger II was planned to be the Navy’s swift move to the future – a stealthy carrier-based bomber that could evade modern air defenses and deliver a deep strike on hostile lands. The trusty A-6 Intruder was aging by the end of the 1980s, and naval planners were looking for a follow-up that could stand the test of a world filled with radar-guided weapons and tightly woven air defense networks.
This need led to the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) initiative. On paper, its goal was to provide the Navy with a stealthy, next-generation war plane ready for the carrier and capable of taking the service to the new era of conflict.
The Air Force had already put the F-117 Nighthawk into operation, a jet that showed the feasibility of stealth and even its revolutionary character. The Navy wanted a similar model of its own. In 1988, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics got the go-ahead, and the A-12 Avenger II started to come to life – at the very least as a concept.
It was a design that the fleet had never before encountered. The aircraft was to sport a tri-angled, manta ray-shaped wing, which was quick to impart it the moniker “Flying Dorito.” All armaments were to be stored internally to maintain stealth, and the plane was to be made of high-tech composites and treated with radar-absorbent materials. There were to be two crew members with modern avionics, precision strike radar, and complex electronic warfare equipment. On paper, it was said to have a combat radius exceeding 900 nautical miles, which was a considerable step up from the old model.
However, bringing that vision to life turned out to be a much bigger challenge than anticipated. It was a very difficult engineering challenge to make a stealth aircraft that was also capable of the tough carrier landing. Weight was a major concern as the plane ended up being much heavier than its creators had anticipated, so doubts even surfaced as to whether it was safe for carrier operations. The new developments in composites and the untried production methods only added to the delays.
The program’s non-disclosure deepened the problem. Being a “black” project, the lack of typical oversight, which might have allowed early rectifications, was in place. Those working on the project were not very open about the problems so as to maintain morale. The Navy officials were reluctant to sound the alarm as they feared the program could come to a halt.
Costs got out of hand. From a $4.8 billion endeavor, it ballooned to almost $11 billion, and the per-unit cost estimates went upwards of $165 million per aircraft. By the beginning of 1991, the program had almost a year and a half, was over budget by billions, but was still without a prototype that could fly.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney called off the program that very January. The A-12 was gone for good, thus becoming the most expensive cancellation in Pentagon history. The only A-12 constructed was a non-functional mockup.
The fallout continued for a long time, and the legal dispute between the government and the contractors over the matter lasted until 2014 before finally being settled. Meanwhile, the Navy heavily relied on the F/A-18 Hornet and later the Super Hornet to do the work that the A-6 used to do. It was only with the introduction of the stealthy F-35C that the fleet got a genuine next-generation strike jet, albeit not a dedicated bomber like the A-12 was designed to be.
Over time, the A-12 Avenger II has become one of the greatest warnings about military technology. It brought out issues with the military’s obsession with doing everything at once technologically, risks of lessened due diligence, and fallout from secrecy gone too far.
The “Flying Dorito” never took off; nevertheless, its history has changed the way the Pentagon oversees large projects by implementing tighter restrictions and more achievable targets before billions are spent on the next supposed breakthrough.