The security landscape of Europe is being reconfigured in ways that stretch far beyond the fighting in Ukraine. For decades, defense across much of the continent relied on America, and defense industries atrophied; armies seemed more symbolic than substantial. Today, as Washington has signaled it may scale back its role as protector of Europe, European countries are at a fork in the road.
This shift in priorities of Americans is watched intently in capitals throughout the continent. The new Washington regimes have given the highest priority to other sectors and signaled to Europe that it cannot turn to America to be ready and waiting anymore. Even if tonight America isn’t departing Europe, the message is unmistakable: European countries need to spend more on their own defense, watch each other’s backs more, and make smart choices about the equipment and capabilities they require. The emerging consensus in Washington is that Europe will have to assume more of its own security costs, whoever occupies the Oval Office.
European defense spending has been shaped by complacency for a long period. During the Cold War, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom always dedicated 3-5% of their GDP towards military defense. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, most money went into social programs, with the armies being poorly equipped and geared.
Even now, the majority of countries are struggling to provide proper support to Ukraine or the soldiers sufficient to protect Europe independently. The 2% GDP defence threshold that is commonly mentioned under NATO is felt to be too low by experts, especially when compared to what its potential rivals are investing. Other countries are now eyeing higher, investing 4% of GDP to aggressively develop and modernise armies.
On paper, European military power is formidable. EU and NATO member nations’ collective defense expenditure and manpower dwarf regional rivals, and their armies are just larger in number. But decades of systemic underinvestment have divided most armies into infinitesimal bits and pieces, with ancient equipment and units too small to matter.
The conflict in Ukraine has revealed such weaknesses and manufacturing choke points, logistical handicaps, and bureaucratic slowing of ammunition and equipment delivery. With the European Union looking at shifting towards a more “war-capable” economy, peace-time planning-to-crisis-level responsiveness has been challenging.
Part of the challenge is institutional and coordinative. NATO remains at the center of European defense, but the European Union has taken on an increasingly significant role in defense research, procurement, and support of Ukraine missions. Occasionally, though, the overlap of missions between NATO and the EU generates tension, hampering decision-making and diluting operational effectiveness. Experts indicate that making cooperation easier and balancing military power across the continent are now crucial measures to be finalized so that Europe will be able to respond easily and adequately to possible threats. Europe also has to focus on rebuilding readiness and strategic capacity.
That will mean increased forces kept at heightened notice, increased exercises to help build towards operational unity, and improved infrastructure for rapid redeployment of forces across borders. Spending on intelligence, surveillance, integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike capacity, and strategic airlift is significant, as these are areas where Europe continues to be heavily dependent on US capability.
Coordinated and packaged buying by states will be needed to fill those gaps. Deterrence, too, has a role. European security for decades was underpinned by a twin pillar of US nuclear assurances and independent British and French nuclear capabilities.
Going forward, Europe needs to balance conventional long-range capability and missile defense with nuclear capability in a way that supports deterrence without making the transatlantic relationship more complicated. A strong deterrence strategy presents options for European leaders and complicates the calculations for potential aggressors. The way ahead will not be easy.
Constructing an independent Europe will take a decade of concentrated spending, institutional change, and cooperative strategy. It will not be a question of spending more but of spending wisely, getting along well, and developing forces that can deal with crises wherever they may occur. Bizarrely, the best hope for long-term security could conceivably be the ability of Europe to stand alone on its own two feet, though continuing to maintain transatlantic alliances.