If you’ve been following the headlines, you know Afghanistan is once again at the center of a global tug-of-war–this time not over troop numbers, but over the fate of Bagram airbase and the future of US-Afghan relations. The sprawling Bagram facility, just north of Kabul, was the beating heart of US operations for two decades. Now, it’s become the latest flashpoint between Washington and the Taliban regime.
Donald Trump, back in the White House, isn’t hesitating. He’s calling for the return of Bagram, threatening Afghanistan that “BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!! ” if the base isn’t returned to the United States, as he wrote in capital letters on social media. The reason? Bagram’s proximity to China–just an hour’s drive from where Beijing produces its nuclear weapons–makes it a strategic gem. Trump’s public pressure on the base, and his threats of “unspecified consequences,” have caused alarm in Kabul and elsewhere.
Pressed by reporters for a response, Trump played his cards close, uttering only, “We won’t talk about that,” while insisting that the US desires the base back “right away.” For Trump, getting Bagram back is not merely a matter of military calculus–it’s about pushing back against China’s expanding footprint in the region and restoring American dominance. The Taliban, newly established in power, aren’t moving. Taliban Defense Ministry chief of staff Fasihuddin Fitrat rejected the possibility of a deal across Afghan territory, declaring, “A deal over even one inch of Afghanistan’s land is impossible. We don’t need it.” The Taliban’s official stance is that Washington must respect the 2020 Doha Accords, which cleared the way for the US departure and involved an agreement not to pose a threat to Afghanistan’s territorial integrity.
Taliban spokespeople have urged the US to “stay true to their word,” even as they leave the door ajar for negotiations to enhance relations–providing there’s no military presence. This confrontation is merely the next installment in a narrative that witnessed the US conclude its longest war in 2021. Joe Biden, in his own words, remained “squarely behind my decision” to pull out, claiming that America’s critical interest was always counterterrorism, not nation-building. Biden’s calculation was influenced by the agreement Trump had struck with the Taliban, leaving him with a stark choice: follow through on withdrawal or escalate combat in a war that had already cost more than a trillion dollars and thousands of lives. Biden’s address was frank–he would not ask “America’s daughters and sons” to fight a civil war that Afghan forces themselves would not fight.
The fall of the Afghan government and military, and the scenes of chaos at Kabul airport, were evidence, in Biden’s estimation, that “ending U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan now was the right decision.” Three years on, the Taliban regime is more solidified than ever. Supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada has concentrated power in his hands, marginalizing challengers and establishing parallel institutions. The government is also exclusionary, favoring the southern Pashtun Taliban and excluding warlords and old republic politicians. Human rights have suffered, including prohibitions on girls’ schooling and restrictions on women’s employment and travel.
Local communities and even some officials of the Taliban have quietly defied the worst decrees, dragging their feet to implement them. Afghanistan is economically struggling. More than 90% of Afghans live in poverty and are insecure over food, and foreign aid has declined. The Taliban have curbed corruption, increasing the tax take, and regional commerce–particularly coal and minerals–has stabilized the economy, but exports have contracted. Haibatullah’s opium poppy cultivation ban, imposed with breathtaking resolve, eliminated half a million jobs and cost the economy at least $1.3 billion.
The regime’s powerbrokers have profited from heroin stockpiles, but if they can’t sell them, internal rifts may emerge.
Regionally, Afghanistan’s neighbors are adjusting. Negotiations to revive the TAPI gas pipeline and CASA-1000 electricity project are ongoing. China has welcomed a Taliban ambassador, and low-key commerce is gaining traction, but significant investment is still elusive. Iran has established deep penetration of the Taliban, although its water interests remain unsatisfied. Russia and China have stepped up diplomatic activity, but no state has issued a formal recognition of the regime.
Counterterrorism is the priority for the US. The Taliban have suppressed the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) with considerable success, and placated China by relocating Uyghur militants from the border. But they’ve declined to take on the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), infuriating Islamabad and putting Chinese interests at risk in Pakistan. The Taliban’s counterterrorism is limited–preventing attacks from Afghanistan, but not expelling foreign fighters or terrorist organizations within.
Washington is now in pursuit of a low-level equilibrium with the Taliban, having open channels to realistic leaders and negotiating quid-pro-quo arrangements. The US continues to stress human rights, particularly for women and girls, but without a change in the power structure of the Taliban, radical change will be unlikely. Providing support to women entrepreneurs, internet education, and humanitarian assistance remains on the table. The Bagram controversy is a microcosm of the larger geopolitical chessboard. America desires a presence to balance China and preserve counterterrorism resources. The Taliban desire recognition, assistance, and respect for their sovereignty. Afghanistan’s neighbors are hedging their bets by talking to the regime and safeguarding their interests. The resolution to this struggle for power will decide not only Afghanistan’s destiny, but the region’s balance of power in Central and South Asia.