Since the early part of 2024, the Ukraine-Russia war has radically changed beyond simply fighting on the front line. Remote-controlled vehicles belonging to Ukraine were increasingly seen launching along with missile attacks into Russian territory deep, attacking an array of installations including oil refineries, fuel depots, and pipelines—their very veins by which the Moscow war machine is nourished. Such attacks signify a major transformation not only in the war but also in how different sides acclimate to the opposing forces.
Ukrainian tactics have undergone a rapid change. At the beginning, the long-distance strikes of the country were mostly concentrated on the military sites close to the front. The reasons behind this were Western limitations on arms deliveries and generally low production capacities of local drones. But as the conflict prolonged and the sanctions did not cut off the cash flow coming from Russian oil, Kyiv had started making its drones and missiles locally. This allowed the Ukrainian capital to get rid of severely important facilities several hundred or even more than a thousand kilometers away, directly hitting the energy infrastructure in Russia rather than imposing merely economic pressure.
The magnitude of the operations speaks for itself. Early in 2025, Ukrainian drone attacks allegedly targeted no less than 81 Russian oil facilities. In some cases, the campaign had the effect of temporarily removing about 10 percent of Russia’s refining capacity. A variety of targets, caused by the attacks, from storage facilities and pump stations have been hit at ports, even reaching cities and bases such as Moscow, Engels, and Izhevsk—far beyond 1,300 kilometers from the front.
The consequences are a mix of economic and operational. The damage done financially is quite considerable. Between September 2024 and February 2025, these attacks resulted in losses of around 60 billion rubles (approximately $714 million), including dozens of tanks that were destroyed. A major and very powerful attack in Feodosia, Crimea, demolished 11 tanks, which together made up 69,000 cubic meters of fuel capacity, and the fire that followed caused an area of more than 3.3 billion rubles ($39 million) in devastation.
Russian oil refineries had to reduce their production, the availability of both gasoline and diesel fell, and the price of fuel went up. The overall refining was temporarily suspended by more than 12 percent, nt—the minimum of the last ten years. The Russian authorities, on the other hand, after the incident, decided not only to stop the publication of the statistics but also to enforce a temporary ban on the export of fuel so that the domestic prices could be stabilized.
Despite the shock, most of the broader economic impacts on Russia have been somewhat limited. The country has more than twice the refining capacity needed to meet its domestic demand. Even if the output offline reaches as much as 10–15 percent, the internal requirements can still able to be met with the help of Belar, which acts as a backup. The majority of the financial losses are borne by the oil companies. They, however, along with the state budget, can still use oil for direct sales at a smaller profit margin to cover the losses in exports of refined products.
From a tactical point of view, the strikes compel Russia to cover a larger area with the same resources. Protecting air defenses in a network so widely scattered is basically a huge challenge. Pantsir missile systems and anti-drone installations, which by now have been put on some refineries, are but the parts of a puzzle that are yet to be revealed. Considering that there are dozens of refineries already at work and some even under construction, the possibility of simultaneous defense of all those facilities is next to none.
Technological advancement has undoubtedly played an instrumental role here. Navionics are affordable, a satellite can provide control, and high-resolution satellite images can be obtained these all allow Ukraine to launch a very precise strike even if it is very far away. The small and cheap drones can now damage a facility worth billions of dollars, and the psychological effect of the war being brought to Russian soil is also as significant as the physical destruction.
Both parties are changing their plans accordingly. Russia has not limited its assault to the areas of Ukraine. It has escalated its attacks on the power sector of Ukraine, which, among other things, comprises industrial facilities; thus, there seems to be a disappearing line between military and economic targets. Meanwhile, despite the doubt about the delivery of future Western military aid, Ukraine, being empowered by the West, continues its domestic drone and missile production that stands as the backbone of its defense strategy.
On the international level, there are calls for measures to restrict those attacks so as to avoid turmoil and escalation in the market. Discussions about periodic cease-fire proposals and temporary suspensions are ongoing while Ukraine keeps launching offensives as long as Russian oil revenues fuel the war. For Kyiv, these operations are among the few real mechanisms to impose costs on the Kremlin.
The destruction of Russian energy infrastructure by Ukraine is a major example showing how modern warfare has evolved. This type of warfare demonstrates how technology, non-conventional tactics, and economic leverage can portray strategic planning even when the immediate damage by itself is not decisive. The war is still not limited to eastern Ukraine; it has deeply intruded into Russia’s industrial heartlands and is having effects on energy markets worldwide and geopolitical considerations. For historians and defense analysts, the most fascinating aspect of such strikes is not only their direct material impact but also how they alter the understanding of war, deterrence, and resilience in the contemporary world.
