When a $100 million Swedish Gotland-class submarine was able to “sink” the $6 billion USS Ronald Reagan during U.S. Navy war games, naval circles were shaken, and a serious reevaluation of sea power in the modern era was precipitated. It’s not just the tale of a tiny submarine outwitting a gargantuan carrier—it’s about the future of naval warfare where stealth and clever design can trump brute muscle and billion-dollar budgets.
The Gotland-class submarine is unique not because of its size or guns, but because it is impossible to make any noise at all. Unlike diesel-electric subs of older design, which must surface repeatedly, the Gotland deploys an air-independent propulsion system driven by Stirling engines. This enables the Gotland to remain underwater for two weeks at a time, running nearly silently.
Its body is covered in sound-absorbing materials, the tower suppresses radar reflections, and even the machinery within is rubber-mounted to dampen vibrations. Equipped with sophisticated counter-detection capabilities and an unusually responsive rudder system, the boat can slip through defenses effortlessly.
In 2004–2005, the U.S. Navy rented the Gotland solely for testing its carrier strike group’s anti-submarine defenses. It was assumed that American destroyers, helicopters, aircraft, and sensors would spot it soon. Instead, the small Swedish sub repeatedly slipped through the carrier group, registered several simulated torpedo hits on the Ronald Reagan, and disappeared undetected.
The crew of the Gotland even took pictures of the carrier through the periscope at one point—a dismal reminder of the vulnerability of even the most sophisticated ships to a competently handled submarine.
This was not a fortuitous accident. In over two years of maneuvers, the Gotland repeatedly beat U.S. Navy defenses, revealing an uncomfortable fact: that the world’s mightiest carriers could be disabled by much smaller, less expensive, and quieter adversaries. For naval strategists, the message was sobering. If a $100 million submarine could penetrate a carrier group’s defense, then the age-long myth of carrier invulnerability had to be reconsidered.
The encounter compelled a change in anti-submarine warfare thinking. It was no longer possible to depend on size, speed, or costly hardware. Navies needed to spend money on improved sonar, smarter sensors, and harder training to prepare their crews to face these sneaky dangers.
Strategists have noted that defending high-value ships entails constructing balanced fleets—big and small ships, manned and unmanned systems, cooperative to cover weaknesses.
And then there’s the cost factor. One carrier means billions of dollars and thousands of lives, yet a relatively small submarine can take it out. That raises difficult questions about the wisdom of spending defense budgets. As observers have pointed out, losing a carrier—actual or mock—would be more than a military loss; it would be a strategic and psychological one.
The success of the Gotland is now a classic case study in contemporary naval warfare. It demonstrated how swiftly the tide can turn in the sea, and how perilous it is to underestimate an inferior but potent threat.
The most significant lesson? The most silent enemy can at times prove deadliest, and the future lies with those navies that innovate fastest towards that reality.