The quest for air supremacy in the United States is at a critical juncture, influenced by a combination of technological hubris, fiscal realities, and changing priorities. The Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which was at one point the focal point of future air combat, is now in an era of reassessment. After years of investment and billions of dollars spent, the program has been put on hold to rethink what is possible, as an accountant, since funding every advanced idea on the table isn’t feasible.
The cost dilemma is stark. Initial estimates placed the cost of each NGAD fighter in the neighborhood of $300 million, but Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has indicated since that a goal more like $80–100 million per aircraft is in the works, which would be about the same as the F-35’s current unit cost. Experts warn, though, that building an actual sixth-generation aircraft for that price is unlikely. Even next-generation fourth-generation aircraft, the F-15EX or Eurofighter Typhoon, cost more than that. The truth is plain: unless concessions are offered in either design or production quantities, the NGAD in its original configuration might still be out of reach.
This economic pinch has brought increased attention to the F-35, a plane much maligned on cost but more and more regarded as a sensible fix. Its enormous production—over 1,000 delivered and 150 more manufactured each year—has reduced costs per unit, making it cheaper than many fourth-generation options. Aside from its cost, the F-35 has consistently demonstrated its capability in large-scale training exercises, consistently posting high kill ratios and proving itself to be superior in fourth-generation air combat. Its sophisticated radar, heavy engine, and sensor fusion provide it with a decisive advantage in beyond-visual-range combat.
The F-35 is anything but static. The forthcoming Block 4 upgrade promises a big improvement: an advanced new radar with nearly twice the detection range, improved infrared guidance, and more internally stowed long-range missiles. Added to the implementation of AI-capable drone wingmen, these upgrades take the F-35’s performance closer to what sixth-generation aircraft were once touted as promising. As some call it, the Block 4 F-35 will “fly alongside drone wingmen, with more powerful onboard radar, expanded infrared targeting, and unprecedented situational awareness.”
But there are still limitations. The F-35’s range, while considerable, cannot be guaranteed to satisfy every theater. Technologies such as stealth drop tanks, being tested on other aircraft now, can stretch reach, but these are palliative measures, not game-changers. Ideally, the NGAD would bridge this gap, but the Air Force might simply have to work with what it has, using ambition to balance against affordability.
This is where the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is needed, as an integral part of the NGAD “family of systems.” The Air Force is currently in the process of creating and testing production-capable CCAs, with big industry players taking the reins. These unmanned wingmen are intended to fly alongside manned fighters and carry sensors, electronic warfare payloads, or more ordnance.
The aim is to ensure flexibility and cost-effective mass, allowing fewer manned jets with increased total impact. As Secretary Kendall has also observed, the progress of the program reflects the payoff of a close partnership with industry partners, who have shared the Air Force’s investment and vision.
The rivalry in the defense industry continues to be intense and ever-changing. Lockheed Martin, the fifth-generation fighter leader, continues to position itself for the NGAD program. Boeing and Northrop Grumman are aggressively competing for opportunities, with Northrop indicating potential re-entry as program requirements change.
Meanwhile, the Navy is developing its next-generation fighter programs, even as funding and readiness priorities shape development tempo. The result is a landscape where strategic priorities, industrial bets, and political decisions are in constant flux.
The competition for air superiority is not just an aircraft contest. It’s a test of industrial capacity, buying agility, and responding to new threats while dealing with fiscal realities. The NGAD’s system-of-systems design, open architecture, and use of digital engineering are all intended to outstrip the pitfalls of previous programs and facilitate quick upgrades. But these new technologies will cost, and the Air Force will need to balance carefully the risk, both of capability and budget.
The choices made now will resonate for decades. Will upgraded F-35s, paired with drone wingmen and cutting-edge digital systems, maintain air superiority until a true sixth-generation fighter is ready? Or will fiscal and technological hurdles force a fundamental rethink of what future air dominance requires? One thing is certain: the race for control of the skies is far from over, and every decision carries consequences well beyond the cockpit.
