Russia’s T-90M main battle tank has arguably been the most controversial armored combat vehicle of recent Russian military history. Called “Proryv,” or “Breakthrough,” it is both a double-duty instrument: as an instrument of war and as a declaration that heavy armor has a role to play in today’s battlefields. It is a symbol of military power and national pride to Russia.
That is not even a simple reworking of a pre-existing earlier Soviet design. The T-90M brings new developments in nearly all aspects. Its base is the 125mm 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun, capable of firing a variety of types of ammunition, including the 9M119M Refleks missile with a five-kilometer reach.
Along with the Kalina fire control system, the tank enjoys thermal sight and a laser rangefinder to utilize at any hour of the day. Hiding under its armor shield is a V-92S2F diesel engine that rumbles along with 1,130 horsepower to propel the tank at speeds of approximately 45 miles per hour with approximately 340 miles of range—sufficiently fast and maneuverable to be effective without ongoing resupply.
Armor has also been improved. Relikt explosive reactive armor will protect it from most modern anti-tank projectiles, and the turret has been redesigned to accommodate digital systems. Crew space has been minimized to make it less cramped, and the loader is more independent to keep crew members alert on long operations. Theoretically, the T-90M is on a par with Western competitors like the M1 Abrams or Leopard 2, but lacking in networked battlefield situational awareness as well as advanced futuristic sensor systems.
Battle life, however, is usually a disappointment. For Syria and Ukraine, the T-90M has been good but not great. The number-one issue is the autoloader for the ammunition underneath the crew compartment—a carryover design borrowed from previous Soviet tanks.
Struck by missiles or tiny drones from top to bottom, it can cause fatal explosions. As military commentator Isaac Seitz expounds, “It’s just as vulnerable to ammo cook-offs as the older models.”
Drone warfare has contributed to these risks. Low-speed, low-endurance FPV drones have proved unexpectedly effective at exploiting weak points. Initial T-90Ms were not well equipped to deal with them, and tactical errors—like sending tanks in without electronic warfare support—have proved expensive. As Seitz puts it, “Even the best tank is a dead tank if it’s sent in alone.”
As a result, the production at Nizhny Tagil’s Uralvagonzavod factory has been intensified. Twenty-four-hour shifts work the production lines that crank out dozens or hundreds of T-90Ms a year, up from 60–70 in 2022. Sanctions rendered imports of some parts difficult, but domestic production has made up the shortfalls, and skilled engineers and machinists must be employed to keep production going.
The actual tanks have changed at a very rapid rate. In the past three years, there have been around 200 that have been added as upgrades, ranging from electronic warfare gear to drone countermeasures, netting against drones, additional armor, and, in certain cases, Arena-M active protection that incinerates incoming missiles. Tanks that roll off the assembly line nowadays are significantly different from tanks that rolled off the assembly line just a few years prior.
Price is also attractive on the T-90M. At around $4.5 million—roughly half the price of an M1 Abrams—it is within India’s and Algeria’s budgets. Exports are welcome for Russia to sustain production and expand its influence abroad.
The T-90M is actually more than machinery. It is a philosophy of new war that believes in heavy tanks even in the age of drones, guided missiles, and electronic warfare. Its sustained success is a function of the extent to which it learns to counter new threats. When it works, the T-90M is a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield; when it doesn’t, it is proof that armor is not up to the task in modern warfare.
