
The explicit confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025 was a watermark moment in the way modern militaries conceptualize war. It wasn’t merely missiles vs. fighter jets—it was an in-the-field test of how current multi-domain warfare works out, with implications for everything from technology to alliances. What was initially a highly coordinated Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities soon escalated into a broader war involving the U.S. and revealing the capabilities and limitations of contemporary defense systems.

Israel launched the whole thing with Operation Rising Lion, a daring preemptive strike that deployed stealth fighters, intelligence, and cyber warfare. More than 200 Israeli Air Force sorties—primarily F-35I Adir and F-15I Ra’am aircraft—hit Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. But these were not merely brute-force strikes. They were supported by months of intel collection and cyber sabotage. Israel’s cyber divisions, particularly Unit 8200 and Mossad, degraded Iranian air defenses and communications before the attack.

The U.S. quickly followed suit with its operation, Operation Midnight Hammer. One of the largest air strikes in recent times, it included over 125 American planes and seven B-2 bombers. The U.S., Gen. Dan Caine reported, dropped 14 gigantic bunker-buster bombs—every 30,000 pounds—on deeply buried nuclear targets. The magnitude of the action made it abundantly clear how much danger Washington perceived.

Iran fought back. It fired hundreds of ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones on Israel, in addition to mounting cyberattacks against vital infrastructure. Israel’s multi-tiered air defense system—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, and U.S. THAAD batteries—performed well, with a claimed 90% rate of interception. But the system was pushed to its limits. Interceptors were depleting, and missile defense teams were exhausted. The Arrow system, specifically, was stretched to its limits, sending warning signals in Israel and the U.S. about how long this defense level would be sustainable.

This stage of the war revealed an uncomfortable reality: missile defense, even at its best, doesn’t deter a persistent enemy from firing. As military analyst Jean-Loup Samaan quipped, systems like Iron Dome can save lives and purchase time—but not deter. Iran’s constant barrage and ongoing attacks by proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis demonstrated that persistent adversaries will continue to fight, regardless of how sophisticated the defensive technology they encounter.

Among the most obvious lessons was the value of alliances. Israel’s capacity to continue hitting back and defending its cities rested on backing from America. The U.S. wasn’t merely offering additional interceptors—it provided real-time intelligence, surveillance, and targeting assistance. That intimate coordination enabled Israel to concentrate on protecting civilians, leaving the U.S. to safeguard military facilities and strategic assets. The war made one thing certain: not even a technologically advanced nation like Israel can fight a war of this nature by itself in a hi-tech, multi-domain conflict.

Cybersecurity and psychological operations were also to the fore. Israel’s initial cyberattacks brought critical Iranian defense systems offline, rendering the initial airstrikes much more effective. Iran hit back with Israeli energy and transport infrastructure being hacked. And off-stage, psychological operations provided another dimension to the war. Israeli agents have been reported to have issued direct threats to individual Iranian commanders before the attacks, spreading confusion and mistrust within Iran’s forces. These psychological operations—combined with precision bombing and cyber attacks—exaggerated the total effect.

However, as the battles continued, the pressure on Israel’s missile shield continued to mount. Supplies of Arrow interceptors were critically low, and so was the United States after shipping bulk quantities of interceptors. This compelled both nations to examine their defense inventories closely and rethink how rapidly they could ramp up production. Though Israel’s multi-layered system—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3—demonstrated it could withstand a broad spectrum of threats, it also identified a strategic weakness: quantity. High-end battles consume interceptors quickly, and that is an opportunity foes are beginning to leverage.

MilCom leaders are learning, among other things, several important lessons from the war. First, both air and cyber dominance remain critical but must be closely tied with instantaneous events-based intelligence and electronic warfare. Second, precision attacks can have exaggerated results, but even hardened targets can be viable, assuming that they are located underground. Third, drone warfare is an integral part of combat now, and countering it needs new technologies—such as AI-driven systems and laser weapons—that don’t consume pricey missiles. Fourth, hybrid warfare is now permanent. Future wars will combine cyber, kinetic, and psychological tools, and armies must be prepared to change gears on short notice.

Lastly, the war tested conventional thinking on deterrence. Having strong defenses and powerful weapons can minimize risk, but they do not ensure an enemy will retreat. Iran was ready to take blows and continue fighting. And proxy threats from the likes of Hezbollah or the Houthis are still difficult to eradicate. Real security will not be based on firepower alone, but on remaining adaptable, maintaining alliances, and being prepared for a battlefield that transcends borders—and definitions of war.

The Israel-Iran conflict was more than another regional flashpoint. It was a preview of the future of war, where success entails dominating everything from stealth fighters and cyber warfare tools to coalitions and control of the narrative. The norms have shifted, and this conflict made that more apparent than ever.
Related images you may be interested in:



