The competition to dominate hypersonic weapons has become one of the characteristic military technology races of the modern era. With competitor nations having operational systems in the field, the United States has been under increasing pressure to keep up. The Air Force’s AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, more commonly referred to as ARRW, was hailed as America’s response: a conventionally armed, air-launched missile designed to cruise at Mach 5 to Mach 8 to hit high-value targets deep within contested areas. But ARRW’s path from idea to test has been a bumpy ride, providing a reminder of the dangers in speeding advanced technology into the field.
The program began to take form after worldwide public disclosures in 2018 of operational hypersonic capabilities. Eager to counter, the Pentagon funnelled resources and attention towards hypersonic research, initiating several initiatives across every branch. The Lockheed Martin-designed ARRW became the Air Force’s top endeavor soon afterward, drawing on technologies from DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide effort. Specifically intended to be carried on the B-52 Stratofortress, and possibly on the B-1B Lancer and F-15E Strike Eagle, ARRW had a range of about 1,000 miles. Its rocket booster would propel a maneuverable glide vehicle to incredible speeds, enabling it to penetrate defenses and strike time-critical targets.
Unlike certain hypersonic systems that were designed strictly for strategic deterrence, ARRW was meant to be a weapon the United States could employ on the battlefield. Its purpose: intimidate critical targets inside highly defended areas, gaining valuable minutes in a rapidly unfolding conflict. The program was given a fast-tracked status under emergency prototyping authority, with the aim of getting an operational missile in the shortest time possible.
Speed in development, however, came at a cost. Since the initial flight test in April 2021, ARRW has experienced repeated delays: missiles that would not detach from their launch platforms, rocket motors that failed to fire, and test-on-spectrum problems that interrupted launches. The program continued despite the absence of a fully accepted test and demonstration plan, with consequences that included failures not only in advanced stages but in fundamental operations. Official analyses observed that ARRW had not yet demonstrated it could provide the warfighting capability it was intended to.
Nonetheless, the Air Force continued. By 2023, planners stated that procurement of ARRW would cease after prototypes, and the hypersonic investment of the future would go toward the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM). Nevertheless, a few dozen ARRW missiles were retained for further testing, to gather data and investigate operating concepts.
One of ARRW’s high points was in early 2024 in the Western Pacific. That February, the Air Force published photos of a live AGM-183A on a B-52H at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. This was more than a technical exercise—it announced to allies and competitors that the U.S. had an operational, albeit experimental, hypersonic capability available in a strategic theater.
During the following weeks, test range advisories and sightings of specialized support aircraft indicated a near launch. On March 17, 2024, a B-52H conducted a long-range sortie from Guam and jettisoned an entire ARRW prototype, the first U.S. hypersonic weapon flight test in that theater. The Air Force called it an end-to-end performance test, yielding valuable information for future development. Lockheed Martin referred to it as the last chapter of the ARRW program and stated it was ready to use what it learned.
Whether the missile hit its target remained unconfirmed, but the test presented the type of operational profile ARRW was intended for—high-speed, long-range attacks on critical assets over great distances. It also indicated Guam’s function as a forward location for strategic bomber operations.
ARRW’s test record, though, continued to be spotty. Few of its live-fire tests were fully successful, with some frustrated by booster, telemetry, or warhead problems. The Congressional Budget Office put the unit cost between $14.9 and $17.5 million—well above the price of older cruise missiles—so that such missiles would likely be limited to only the most strategic and heavily defended targets.
Aside from ARRW, the hypersonic competition maintains its pace. Other nations have fielded or are in the process of building air-, land-, and sea-based systems. The United States is now emphasizing next-generation designs such as HACM, which employs air-breathing propulsion to achieve more range and versatility. Allied projects also continue to progress, from combined propulsion testing to shared cruise missile ventures.
The ARRW saga leaves more than just equipment behind—it provides a lesson in hard knocks. Rushing a weapon to combat before it is ready can erode both confidence and capability. Moving forward, the focus is on shifting to reliability, operational utility, and cooperating with allied forces. The hypersonic race is hardly over, but the U.S. seems hell-bent on fielding not only the fastest, but the most reliable and survivable systems for the tasks at hand.