The Su-75 Checkmate was introduced with promises to disrupt the market for fighter aircraft—a low-profile, single-engine, fifth-generation stealth fighter that will offer sophisticated capabilities at a fraction of the cost of Western peers. Sukhoi introduced it during the MAKS 2021 air show, and the news was received with anticipation. The idea was simple: a stealth fighter for countries that wanted state-of-the-art performance without the means to pay for an F-35 or Eurofighter Typhoon. But as of mid-2025, the Checkmate’s journey from demonstrator to production has been far from linear, beset by delays, financial issues, and the vagaries of a changing international politics.
On paper, the Su-75 is a good deal. It’s intended to be a light tactical stealth interceptor with a speed of Mach 1.8, a fighting radius of approximately 3,000 kilometers, and a payload capacity of more than seven tons. Its internal bay will be utilized to deliver different air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, including those of the Russian heavier Su-35 and Su-57.
The V-tail layout and aerodynamically designed airframe of the aircraft are meant to reduce radar detectability, and its avionics system will likely include state-of-the-art AI-based equipment for better situational awareness. Sukhoi has even stated that the fighter was designed directly on supercomputer models for the first time ever in Russia, which is meant to accelerate design efforts and save money.
The appeal is less about technology. Sukhoi has marketed the Checkmate as a low-cost option for air forces that prefer to purchase advanced capability without the expense of an elite-level stealth fighter. The initial estimates were that each plane would cost $25 to $30 million, and operating costs would be about $6,000 an hour—numbers calculated to spin defense planners with tight budgets’ heads. There have been proposals for three versions: the single-seat version, the two-seat version, and even an unmanned version, expanding its market base.
Reality turned out to be more complex, however. The Checkmate’s first flight has been delayed again and again—from an original 2023 target to 2025—and production in quantity is no longer expected before 2027. Sukhoi and United Aircraft Corporation officials claim the project is well advanced in development, but questions are being raised as to whether or not the schedule is achievable. The delays are as much politics and economics as they are engineering problems.
The conflict in Ukraine has had two effects. It has served to make a lighter, more affordable fighter a potential asset to complement heavier designs. But it has also drawn funds of money and industry away from existing programs like the Su-35 and Su-34 to meet near-term operational requirements. That diversion has taken less money and skilled labor away from experimental programs like the Su-75.
Foreign investment was expected to help carry the program forward. The United Arab Emirates was once considered a leading partner, potentially providing both funding and technical input. But over time, Abu Dhabi’s interest cooled, and it stepped back from the project. Analysts point to a combination of missed deadlines, the impact of sanctions, and the UAE’s desire to maintain strategic relationships with Western suppliers. Without that support, Sukhoi has not been successful in recouping the lost sum, and although nations like India have been courteously interested, there have been no solid guarantees entered into.
Sanctions added still another complexity. Export controls sheared off access to high-tech electronics, precision parts, and other critical systems that had hitherto been imported from overseas. Accounts coming out of the recent war have revealed Western-made electronics in Russian missiles, describing just how reliant certain programs had been on overseas sources—and how hard it now is to replace them.
Despite this failure, Russia still exports the Checkmate overseas. It has been seen at overseas defense shows, with offers of co-production, technology transfer, and even deeper price reductions to entice purchasers. The marketing is like the international partner approach to other large fighter programs, where joint production entices political and economic investment.
Yet, the reaction of potential customers has been lukewarm. Without a flying prototype, most buyers do not want to proceed with a jet that is presently a series of promises. The history of the delayed delivery of the Su-57 only served to increase that doubt. The cost and intended capabilities of the Checkmate are enticing, certainly. But with no substance behind it, it could be a case of over-promised, under-delivered aspiration.
For the time being, the Su-75 Checkmate is a message from Russia that it is willing to shake up the stealth fighter market of the world, while at the same time showing the boundaries of its defense sector. Whether purchased by the world in large numbers or a program rests on the brink of cancellation, on more than flight and engine specifications. Economics, coalitions, and the facts of industrial capability will ultimately decide whether the Checkmate delivers on its promise—or is a recollection of chances never taken.