The conflict in Ukraine has brought back scary memories that many thought were history from the Cold War era: the impact of nuclear weapons on world safety. Every fight and every diplomatic move is accompanied by the unspoken but very present shadow of nuclear escalation. Since the invasion of Russia, nuclear conversations have been ever-present like background noise in the conflict—sometimes quite loud, sometimes quite soft, but never quite off.
On the whole, Russia’s atomic plans have been a combination of complete understanding and mystery, a thought-out juggling act which is hard for competitors to work out. Russia still had the most powerful nuclear weapons arsenal in the world in 2023, consisting of almost 4,500 active warheads, although about 1,700 were deployed.
The Russian doctrine describes four main events that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons: a confirmed missile attack on Russia or its friends, the first use of WMD, command system attacks, or aggression with conventional weapons that threatens the survival of Russia. Volunteer experts of the present-day Kremlin say that if required to regain control or send a powerful signal, the Russian regime might even break the limits established in its doctrine. The point which the threat of Russia’s ‘very existence’ is left deliberately unclear, and it is the vagueness that is the main source of the strategists’ apprehension.
Witnessing the conflict in Ukraine, these questions had already become real-life issues rather than mere academic debates. The war has been very much a personal matter for President Vladimir Putin. To keep his argument, the analysts picture him as conceiving the disintegration of his regime as synonymous with the disintegration of Russia itself. Due to the muddied division, the danger is escalated, and the losses on the battlefield become ‘existential’.
The research confirms that in cases of crisis in conventional warfare, for instance, Ukraine’s counterattacks in Kherson and Kharkiv, or when Western aid increases sharply, there is always a surge in nuclear rhetoric by Russia. The timing of the October 2022 “dirty bomb” scare with big nuclear exercises was an example of how Moscow employs nuclear threats both as a deterrent and as a tool of psychological pressure. Many governments, which publicly warned against any nuclear use, did this not only to discourage Moscow but also to send a message that the threat was taken seriously.
The real threat hinges on the possibility of a spillover between conventional and nuclear hostilities. Incidentally, the escalation could thus occur along routes that neither side had planned, while both sides assume the other is at their limit. The United States and NATO have been acting cautiously, incrementally raising the level of weapons and assistance for Ukraine without taking steps that could be considered a more direct involvement by them.
They have been aiming at the simultaneous prevention of both horizontal escalation (enlarging the conflict area) and vertical escalation (deepening the destructiveness of the conflict). The question, however, still hangs there, which is how Russia understands its territory and sovereignty. Areas that have been taken over, for instance, are places that Moscow treats as its own, regardless of whether the whole world recognizes such claims or not. The ambiguity that allows for potential errors is evident here.
NATO has taken action that is beyond the usual scenarios. After 2022, the alliance has committed more troops, revitalized defense schemes, and established new multinational battlegroups extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Military support for Ukraine has amounted to more than tens of billions of euros, and there are plans for further assistance in the coming years. It is not only that the assistance is for Ukraine’s survival, but also that it sends a message to Moscow that NATO’s pledge of collective defense will not be shaken. The alliance has made its biggest strategic change since the Cold War, becoming stronger and more active with its eastern flank.
The struggle has also exposed the vulnerability of nuclear arms control in quite a pronounced way. The decision of Russia to suspend its participation in the New START Treaty and its insistence that arms control be linked to political concessions have both set back progress a long way of progress. The breakdown of negotiations on strategic stability demonstrates the extent of the problem when trust collapses. Even the strongest binding agreements are only as good as the rivals’ willingness to comply.
In the future, the security dilemma will still intensify. Russia seems more inclined to rely on nuclear weapons to balance the growing conventional strength of NATO. Meanwhile, NATO is installing new defense layers such as cyber defense, infrastructure protection, and the preparation for chemical, biological, and radiological threats. Neither side appears to be ready to retreat, thus making future arms control negotiations even more challenging.
The Ukraine war has become a modern deterrence laboratory, where nuclear threats, alliance politics, and the chaos of war are mingled into an unstable mix. These conflict lessons will not be the ones to end with the war itself. They will determine the thoughts of the great powers on escalation, arms control, and stability for decades to come.