Following the humiliating defeat at Kasserine Pass, the US II Corps was at a turning point in North Africa. The defeat had laid bare severe weaknesses in American coordination, leadership, and readiness for combat. When General Harold Alexander of the 18th Army Group toured II Corps in February 1943, he was not exactly thrilled. His report was a bleak picture of the command of Major General Lloyd Fredendall. There was some silver lining, however: troop morale was still fairly high, and Major General Orlando Ward’s 1st Armored Division seemed to be poised for better things.
Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower had become increasingly exasperated with Fredendall’s failures. He brought in Major General George S. Patton, Jr., and his battle-tested, aggressive command style to II Corps to replace him. To balance things, Eisenhower also promoted Major General Omar Bradley to be Patton’s deputy, in part to moderate Patton’s hot head. Patton soon grew to trust Bradley as a steady right-hand man.
Patton did not waste any time. He commanded an estimated 88,000 men, comprising the 1st, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Armored Division, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, the 1st Ranger Battalion, and several tank destroyer battalions. Eisenhower and Alexander took a number of steps to enhance II Corps’ efficiency: veteran British liaison officers from the Eighth Army were added to direct and advise, obsolescent 37mm antitank guns were replaced by British 6-pounders, and veteran soldiers from other units were added for depth.
Patton had a mission: drive Axis troops out of Gafsa and move east to El Guettar, Sened Station, and Maknassy. Not a lightning run for the coast, but rather a series of incremental victories to bolster morale in II Corps and convince Allied commanders that the job was being done. Americans were also assigned the mission of pinning down Axis troops away from Field Marshal Montgomery’s Eighth Army, which was moving north along the Mareth Line toward Tunis.
The attack started out with Ward’s 1st Armored Division advancing on Gafsa, where they found the enemy had already vacated. Patton encouraged his troops to keep moving, but the desert converted into mud quickly due to heavy rains, clogging up vehicles and hindering the advance. Colonel William Darby’s 1st Ranger Battalion took El Guettar with little resistance, although advances towards Sened were more problematic. Artillery fire later pushed the remaining defenders out of Sened, capturing many prisoners in the process.
Patton’s flamboyant tactics at times conflicted with the more conservative methods his commanders wanted. Initially instructed to make a limited demonstration against Maknassy, he advocated an all-out attack, occupying strategic heights and destroying enemy airfields.
In spite of his determination, Ward’s tank forces routinely found Axis troops had evaporated, as the Americans had to contend with mud and battlefield disorganization. Ward, who was cautious, preferred methodical, planned attacks to expensive daylight battles, which irritated Patton’s impatience.
The real test occurred when the Germans counterattacked. On March 23, 1943, at dawn, the 10th Panzer Division attacked II Corps’ positions. Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen’s 1st Infantry Division opposed the approaching panzers at dawn in the valley. German early gains were checked at the Keddab wadi, where American mines wrecked eight tanks. Supported by artillery and tank destroyers in pursuit, the Americans disabled another thirty vehicles. The Germans reformed and launched a second attack at dusk, but were again thwarted by determined artillery fire.
Fighting about El Guettar was fierce but indecisive. Both sides inflicted great losses, and neither was able to make a decisive breakthrough in the next days. Nevertheless, II Corps showed impressive improvement. Contrary to the disorganized operations during February, the corps now acted as an integrated force, keeping initiative and counterattacking effectively.
Patton’s leadership did create tension, eventually helping to give Ward relief for his slower, more cautious style. Although Patton and other generals desired a quick drive to the coast, Alexander’s methodical strategy of gaining victory through incremental steps worked. As the campaign went on, II Corps became progressively stronger and assisted the Allies in keeping the upper hand in North Africa.
Tunisia was a challenging proving ground for the developing American military. The lessons of that experience—learned through experiment, mishap, and adjustment—were applied to the forces that subsequently fought in Europe. Patton’s retooling of II Corps had made it a more self-assured, effective fighting force. When the campaign was over, the Allies had killed close to 200,000 Axis soldiers and taken approximately 275,000 prisoners, a telling blow that set the stage for additional triumphs in the Mediterranean theater.