Did you see how Russia’s Ukraine war reports have started getting mixed up with reports of strange fires, torched cables, and unexpected sabotage across Europe? Coincidence? Don’t think so. War geopolitics are shifting, and Russia’s shadow war against the West is being waged in ways that are making us rethink what security, deterrence, and even peace really are.
The magnitude of Russian sabotage has reached exponential proportions in the last several years. Statistics reveal that the number of attacks grew threefold from 2023 to 2024 after having already quadrupled the previous year. And these are not even cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns, yet those are happening too. This is physical disruption: bombing of weapon-producing factories, cutting into cable wires, cutting off undersea fiber-optic cables, and even executive and defector attacks. It is precise: transportation networks, government offices, pipelines, data cables, and defense contractors tied to Ukraine. The plan is clear: Moscow wants to make it more costly and more difficult to subsidize Kyiv.
This is not new. It is a testament to the supposedly “active measures” of Soviet times, when the KGB employed disinformation, psychological warfare, covert sabotage, and surrogates to exhaust the West without provoking outright conflicts. These days, the strategy is the same but with a digital twist: cyber warriors such as Fancy Bear and Sandworm, commercial ships employed in subsurface operations, and an army of local conscripts and surrogates all take their turn. It is the GRU, Russian military intelligence, that coordinates much of it—poisonings in Britain, attacks on British and German defense plants.
Why pursue this dark course? It’s holding short of the level that would entail an all-out NATO reaction. Such sabotage is customarily constructed not readily traceable to Russia, so Moscow can disrupt supply chains, intimidate governments, and shake public confidence without precipitating an all-out war. These are cheap, highly deniable, and strategically useful activities.
The tools at Moscow’s disposal are far-reaching and developing. GRU Unit 29155, for example, has been linked with everything from top-tier poisonings to failed coups and attempts on the lives of government leaders. Other units focus on cyberoperations, and there are even shadowy fleets of tankers and research vessels that roam and tap subsea infrastructure.
When operatives are caught and expelled, Russia has a tendency to use surrogates—criminal organizations, business interests, and locals—to continue the work, and introduce layers of possible deniability that keep the Western governments wondering endlessly.
What has the West done by way of retaliation? Mostly on the defensive: stepped-up intelligence sharing, stepped-up patrols, fortified installations, and expulsion of probable Russian spies. NATO created new coordinating committees to protect undersea cables and began surveillance operations like Baltic Sentry.
The EU and NATO have also created joint task forces to increase resilience. These steps, while useful, are not costly for Russia and cannot be expected to cause Moscow to cut back activities. Arrests, sanctions, and border controls do have some impact, but the overall Kremlin policy has not changed.
Why has the West responded with such restraint? Partly fear of being drawn into a broader war. No one wants to stumble into all-out conflict. There is also a psychological frame of mind that if the West is not technically “at war” with Russia, it cannot respond to the offense. But some argue this restraint might do the opposite and fuel more hostility. Russia has already upped the ante, and being defensive only will most likely be seen as a weakness, not a solution.
Others are pushing for a more robust response. That could mean increasing the sanctions, targeting shadow fleets, taking limited cyber-offensive measures against Russian networks, and conducting information operations to influence domestic and foreign opinion. The thinking is simple: sabotage has to hurt, and Moscow will have to learn that further attacks will cost dearly in the real world.
The implications are massive. With the war in Ukraine entering its umpteenth month, this shadow war in Europe and the West shows no signs of diminishing. The lines between war and peace, between battlefronts and home fronts, are blurring. In order to protect societies, economies, and values, the West may be forced to reconsider what deterrence in an era when hybrid warfare is the new normal even means.
