Hypersonic weapons have been one of the most high-profile areas in which militaries worldwide have competed in recent times. With other countries progressing quickly, the U.S. felt it was necessary to create its own capability as soon as possible. One way this could be achieved was through the Air Force’s AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, which was supposed to act as the replacement.
ARRW is an aircraft-launched rocket-assisted missile designed to reach speeds within the Mach 5 and Mach 8 range. The idea was perfectly sound. Deep within heavily protected areas, the rocket could hit vital targets before the enemy could react. But, through this ambitious scheme, to make a working weapon, it had been demonstrated that the huge hurdles of putting state-of-the-art systems in real-world settings.
The momentum for this program was received in 2018 when the Pentagon disclosed that foreign powers had started to deploy hypersonic systems. Lockheed Martin’s ARRW, which was the derivative of DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide project, rapidly became the number one priority for the Air Force. At first, it was only compatible with the B-52 Stratofortresses for launching, but later, B-1B Lancers and F-15E Strike Eagles came in as well. The idea of the missile’s booster was to launch the flexible glide vehicle that would travel over 1,000 miles at an extreme speed, evade defenses, and destroy the targeted sensitive areas in a short time.
Unlike hypersonics that were developed to be deterrents, ARRW was a weapon that was created for use in actual war. The idea was bold: a missile that was so fast, it would be able to overpower the defense and so accurate, it could neutralize strategic targets in no time. To achieve the goal rapidly, the program had to work under emergency prototyping conditions, which allowed it to skip some parts of the regular acquisition process.
Nonetheless, the fast tempo also had a downside. One major setback event happened to ARRW when its first flight test was carried out in April 2021. There was a report of the majority of the missiles that did not separate from the carrier aircraft, a few of them were incorrectly launched, and in the process of testing, some of them crashed. The program was going back and forth without a performance plan that was completely viable. Experts said if the Air Force was to keep the fund flowing, ARRW had to demonstrate that it was ready for battle.
On the other side of the coin, the Air Force kept on with the project for several years. The decision not to proceed beyond the stage of prototype orders was actually made by officials in 2023. The money left in the account was sent to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), a scramjet-powered platform that offers longer range and more options. The first generations of the ARRW were held for further experimentation as well as data gathering so that the errors would not recur.
One uncommon ray of sunshine for the program was early 2024, in February, when pictures were taken at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam of a B-52H over there loading a live AGM-183A. This was more than a mere demonstration of the engineering capabilities; it was a statement that a developmental and operational hypersonic capability was in the hands of the U.S. On the 17th of March, a B-55H went on a long-range mission and let go of an ARRW test article. The Air Force described it as a full-range trial, which gave them valuable data, whereas Lockheed Martin portrayed it as the last ARRW chapter and a transition point for the upcoming designs.
Whether the missile hit the target accurately was of lesser importance than validating the mission concept, i.e., long-range, fast strikes against strategic targets, and also the strategic significance of Guam as a Pacific command center.
ARRW, on the whole, showed a mixed bag of results. Most flight tests of the program encountered problems, such as the booster not functioning, the telemetry issue, etc. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost per missile ranging from $14.9 million to $17.5 million, which is almost several times higher than traditional cruise missiles. The statement that the cost of pioneering such advanced technology was made clear.
As ARRW is in its last stages, the hypersonic race is still on. The U.S. is now concentrating on next-generation projects such as HACM, which are characterized by air-breathing propulsion for extended range and flexibility. The existence of allied programs confirms the assumption that this contest is still far from ending, as they are developing a co-operation strategy in technology and shared development.
ARRW brings with it a cautionary tale: a weapon that is introduced before it is fully reliable only serves to erode confidence and capability. The future of hypersonics will pivot not only on speed but also on reliability, survivability, and actual combat effectiveness. So, on the one hand, if we put ARRW in the past, on the other hand, we can only see the bigger picture of fast, reliable, and strategically useful weapons that are just at the dawn of their development in America.