First off, the A-12 Avenger II was actually intended to lead the U.S. Navy into the future—a stealthy, carrier-borne bomber that could pass undetected under the enemy defensive shield and hit targets far away from the fleet. By the end of the 1980s, the aging A-6 Intruder was almost out of service, and the Cold War was requiring the U.S. to get more hardier planes which could last in a world full of radar-guided missiles and layered air defenses.
So, it was the need for such aircraft that gave birth to the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program. The job was quite simple if looked at from the blueprint level, but difficult and ambitious in terms of actual performance: Make a next-generation stealth attack jet with carrier operation feasibility.
The United States Air Force had the F-117 Nighthawk already, which gave evidence to the Navy that stealth was achievable, and so the Navy desired one similar to theirs. McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics won the competition in 1988, and the A-12 Avenger II was the result—well, at least on paper.
The aircraft design was the least typical one in the fleet. Because of its smooth, triangular “flying wing” layout, it was soon given the nickname “Flying Dorito.” These planes were to internally hide their arms, be made of modern composite materials, and be coated with radar-absorbing paint. Two pilots would be operating in a cockpit that was fully loaded with state-of-the-art avionics, ground scanning radar, and electronic warfare gadgets. Over 900 nautical miles of the combat radius, it promised to carry the strength and the firepower that were far more than what had been done by previous ones.
However, it was quite a different story when it came to turning that dream into reality. The satisfaction of stealth obligations, at the same time, dealing with the harsh conditions of carrier takeoffs and landings was a very big engineering obstacle. The airplane began to gain weight much more than it was initially projected, therefore raising issues about whether it could be safe to function on the flight deck or not. The involvement of new materials and engaging unknown production methods only made the game more complex and created a chain of delays in the process.
Secrecy was adding more fuel to the fire. As a secret “black” program, the A-12 was beyond normal supervision. Congress and even the top Pentagon officials only had limited information about the problems that were getting worse. The contractors were minimizing their losses to gain support, and at the same time, naval officers were avoiding the admission of how far the project had gone off track.
The cost was spiraling. Where the project initially started with $4.8 billion in development costs later increased to almost $11 billion, and it was estimated that the unit cost for a single plane was more than $165 million. In early 1991, the aircraft was at least 18 months late, $billions over budget, and still not ready to fly.
The crisis moment was in January 1991 when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney decided to end it. It was the biggest contract termination in the history of the Pentagon. The only full-scale mockup of the A-12 was a flying prototype. The consequences were messy. There was a huge and prolonged lawsuit between the government and the contractors that lasted over two decades and ended only in 2014.
In the absence of the A-12, the Navy relied more on the F/A-18 Hornet and then the Super Hornet to be the strike units. The stealth was later brought to carrier decks by the F-35C, but it was quite a different aircraft from the heavy, long-range bomber that the A-12 was designed to be.
Now, the Avenger II is one of the failure stories in military aviation that the public can remember. Pushing technology too far, underestimating the dangers, and keeping the problems secret were among the factors that exposed it.
The “Flying Dorito” was still on the ground, but its story changed the way the Pentagon overviews the ambitious weapons programs–by implementing more rigorous, more realistic, and more accountable checks.
