As the world ushered in the 21st century, America’s armed forces declared a vision of ambition towards a leviathan program: totally overhauling the tank. Leading the charge was the XM1202 Mounted Combat System, a tank designed to supplant the M1 Abrams with a combination of speed, power, and sophistication. But the XM1202 was only a new tank—a, in fact, the climax of the gargantuan Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, a vision to reconfigure the Army as lighter, quicker, and more networked.
The FCS program, initiated in 1999 by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, was to create a family of vehicles based on a common platform. The idea was genius in its simplicity: modular construction would be easier to repair, minimize logistical nightmares, and even permit some of the vehicles to be air-dropped on C-130s.
The XM1202 was only one of eight crewed vehicles built under the program, each serving a distinct purpose but sharing a uniform set of components and a single digital back.
The distinguishing feature of the XM1202 was its bold application of technology. Its XM360 light 120mm gun could fire both traditional ammunition and guided missiles with no difference. The tank also had the XM1111 Mid-Range Munition, which shot around corners out of the line of sight of crew members—a capability that could revolutionize tank warfare. Automation was also very much present, with an autoloader downsizing crew to commander and driver, and stripping duties conventionally performed by humans to machinery.
The electronic equipment was also state-of-the-art. Advanced infrared sensors and an internet-like tactical net system gave unprecedented situational awareness. Active protection systems, such as Raytheon’s Quick Kill, were also manufactured that had the capability of alerting the crew early about incoming fire and sending them to kingdom come, making up for the thinner armor since the tank was lighter. It was 18 to 24 tons, much lighter than the Abrams but more agile—though at the price of being unable to shoot back.
But the same technology that had made XM1202 the best so far turned out to be the root of its failure. It was much harder to balance firepower and armor, and trim weight than ever before conceived. Not all of the technologies were fully tested, and merging them into a functional tank provided technical horrors almost impossible to surmount.
Meanwhile, the nature of the battlefield was also changing. Iraqi and Afghan counter-insurgency experience introduced the terrifying impact of IEDs and required vehicles that could withstand them. Such light-speed tanks as the XM1202 were now useless, and all eyes were turned to MRAPs that could provide much greater protection for asymmetrical warfare.
Bureaucracy and spending overruns were tacked on to the program. The FCS program was infamous for profligate spending and infinitesimal reward. It was canceled in 2009, having squandered more than $18 billion without ever producing a deployable vehicle.
The XM1202, with its deadly profile and suspect battlefield worth, was the prime candidate for the axe. Breaking up contracts between companies such as Boeing, BAE Systems, and General Dynamics made it only more complicated.
When the program was canceled by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the Army returned to more traditional solutions: modernizing tried-and-true platforms such as the M1 Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicle instead of betting it all on untested concepts. It was a decision for bottom-line success today over promise tomorrow.
But the XM1202 wasn’t all bad. Much of its technology—networked communications, active protection, and materials that are lightweight and embedded in other programs. And more importantly, the project and the FCS program learned a valuable lesson: innovation is needed, but it must be based on the experience of how the soldier fights. That lesson still affects the Army’s development of armored vehicles to this day.