Back in the early 2000s, the U.S. Army aimed to visualize a new, modern tank. At the core of this idea was the XM1202 Mounted Combat System – a machine to not only replace the M1 Abrams but also to change the whole concept of armored warfare. The XM1202 was merely a tank of the future (FCS), a game-changing project envisaged to transform the Army into a force that was lighter, quicker, and more linked.
The FCS project, initiated in 1999 by the then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, imagined a range of fighting vehicles sharing a common chassis. In addition to simple logistics, the modular design intended that all vehicles would be easy to maintain and be able to be transported quickly by air, with the XM1202 expected to be light enough for an aircraft like the C-130. Eight manned ground vehicle variants were designed, each having a unique function on the battlefield and yet working on shared components as well as a common digital network.
The character of the XM1202 was its adoption of frontier technology. It was the XM360 120mm lightweight cannon as the core of its construction, allowing for to use of both conventional but also guided rounds when firing. Among the sophisticated munitions was the XM1111 Mid-Range Munition, which, being able to give exact attacks far over the line of sight, was a feature that could radically change tank engagement. The XM1202’s autoloader made it possible for only a two-person crew—the commander and the driver—to use the equipment since the automation takes on the tasks usually given to a gunner.
One of the greatest contributors to the design of the XM1202 was the use of the latest technology in the field of electronics. The Generation II forward-looking infrared sensors and the connected battlefield perception systems that were installed were supposed to give a huge advantage to the crew. Active protection platforms, among them Raytheon’s Quick Kill, were planned to shoot down the threats that were coming in, making up for the lighter armor of the car.
Compared to the Abrams of 60 plus tons, the XM1202 was just 18 to 24 tons, which made it very movable, and therefore it was considered a vehicle for deployment, but its security was questioned because of its light weight.
Despite this, the same innovations that made the XM1202 so intriguing also made it difficult to achieve. The project had to be a very difficult one in which they had to reduce the weight but still maintain the armor and firepower. Most of the technologies that they counted on, such as lightweight armor, networked communications, and active protection systems, were still at the very beginning of the development stage. It turned out that bringing together these untested systems into one operative platform was much more complicated than had been expected.
Meanwhile, the world also changed. As the US Army got more and more involved in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea of heavily armed but lightly armored conventional tanks seemed to lose its importance. The increased use of IEDs and other types of threats on the battlefield exposed the weaknesses of light platforms, and as a result, the military’s focus shifted towards vehicles that were more protected, like the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that offered better security in asymmetric warfare scenarios.
The main reason for the situation of XM1202 worsened further due to financial and management errors. The FCS program, once a promise of cost overruns and very little in return, became a scandal. Fifteen years after its withdrawal, the program had invested more than 18 billion dollars but had failed to produce one single type of vehicle that could be deployed.
Particularly referring to the XM1202, it was seen as a high-risk investment with doubtful usefulness on the battlefield. Congress and the Department of Defense increasingly questioned the program’s practicality, and more and more pressure finally led to the program being shut down. On top of that, the presence of several contractors, i.e., Boeing, BAE Systems, and General Dynamics, added to the program’s complexity and inefficiency.
The Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s announcement in 2009 that FCS was over marked a very different profile of Army modernization strategy. Instead of building new vehicles from scratch, the Army decided to invest in the existing ones like the M1 Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, as well as in immediately practical rather than speculative technologies.
Even though the XM1202 never made it to the battlefield, it still has a big name. The technologies that were developed for it – networked communications, active protection systems, and lightweight materials are now being used in other projects. The lessons that were learned with the XM1202 and the whole FCS program remain quite valuable, and they are a constant reminder to the Army that there is a thin line between wanting something and actual operational feasibility. Now, these lessons are still affecting the vehicles that are being developed and are both innovative and doable.