The search for the U.S. Navy to discover a larger, better fleet has never been cruise control. If there was a story that embodied the rollercoaster experience, then it had to be that of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and its saga of grand promises, expensive mistakes, and lessons now influencing the Navy’s future.
From “Swiss Army Knife” to “Little Crappy Ship
The naval commanders of the early 2000s were asking for something fresh: a small and fast enough, loose and agile enough ship to get the difficult work done in close-to-water operations. Admiral Vernon Clark had witnessed a Danish exercise of a spread of modular weapons on a deck and envisioned the possibility of reorganizing the function of a ship in an overnight virtual flip—sub-hunting one week, minesweeping the next. On the market was an over-armed but under-manned “Swiss Army knife” warship.
Congress made the case, and contractors like Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics bid on it with promises of high-tech designs at discount prices. Paper innovation turned into a nightmare in short order, though. The costs almost doubled, performance lagged, and critical systems failed. The “multi-mission marvel” earned a very different nickname among sailors soon after.
Politics, Contractors, and the “Zombie Program”
The issues with the program were not technical. Politics kept LCS going past the point at which uncertainty had already set in. After the ships were about to start rolling off the production lines and people were losing jobs, politically, it was too expensive to cancel the program.
Ray Mabus, Navy Secretary for most of the program’s duration, battled to add hulls to expand the fleet even as opponents doubted that the ship would ever have a purpose in real combat. Cuts were always stymied by Congress, typically by constituency shipbuilding members.
Frustrations at Sea
Sea life for those who did manage to serve was more frustrating than sense. Breakdowns were routine, leaving stranding crews in port rather than at sea. Technical information and instruction manuals provided to contractors simply guaranteed that it would not be repairable. Jams, gear failures, and perpetually defective weapons packs simply never performed as promised. Scores were removed from service within less than a decade—a tiny fraction of the lifespan with which they were originally intended. “A spokesman phrased it tactfully: without operating systems, the ships were “just a box floating in the ocean.”
Hard Lessons, New Directions
Even with the pain of the LCS disaster, it has compelled the Navy to reconsider its shipbuilding strategy. The spotlight is back on heavier frigates and destroyers, warships best suited to fight and withstand hostile seas.” Today, the long-term vision is a more than 500-strong fleet of improved platforms, integrating manned warships with increasingly unmanned platforms.
A vision of a more dispersed, more agile, built-around-real-stuff style fleet versus modular experiments. But there are challenges. Yards are working around the clock without workers, slowing down the material. Shipbuilding is now so much longer in duration than previously, and the maintenance backlog keeps submarines and surface ships in shipyards rather than at sea.
NAVSEA’s Drive for Change
In a bid to get in front of these challenges, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) issued a new strategy that will speed up deliveries, increase readiness, and provide the foundation for the sort of high-end warfare the Navy expects it will be engaged in the next few years.
Vice Adm. Jim Downey has made it a priority to shift from “just in time” logistics to “just in case,” command restructuring, and investing in people. The goal is straightforward: get ships to the fight on schedule, and within a price tag that the Navy can handle.
Looking Ahead
The LCS debacle is not a catastrophe—but a wake-up call. The Navy learned the hard way about the hubris of providing too much technology, reducing lowball budget requests to smithereens, and allowing politics to dictate policy. And it is applying those lessons in crafting tomorrow’s fleet. On the horizon, not distant, is a Navy not only larger but wiser, tougher, and more capable of delivering what the seas have in mind.